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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to analyze the income and 
expenditure patterns at three Liberal Arts I colleges in 
the Midwest from 1979-89. It is a follow-up study that 
responds to Earl Cheit's landmark study, The New Depression 
in Higher Education sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation in 
1971. It combines hard data from HEGIS/IPEDS reports and 
interviews with leading administrators to examine the 
effects the 1980s had on the institutions and makes a 
judgment about the financial condition of each college as 
they entered the 1990s. The study also examines some of 
the effects state, local and federal spending had as an 
income source and how the amount of public money that 
filtered down to these colleges varied over the decade. 
Lastly, it presents the administrators' policy views about 
solutions to help ensure a financially strong sector of 
liberal arts colleges, with the goal of maintaining these 
institutions as a viable option for students and preserving 
diversity within the American higher system.
Several conclusions are presented based on the 
analysis. The colleges did not survive financially through 
strategies of retrenchment. Each college showed dramatic 
increases in E&G spending well above the inflation rate. 
Most of the spending increases were devoted to managing and 
promoting the institutions as well as to student services
and student financial aid and attracting philanthropic 
dollars. This has negatively influenced the percentage of 
expenditures devoted to educational programs but this 
varied from college to college, as well as its impact on 
the quality of the academic program. While most income 
sources increased, the majority of the revenue for the 
rapid increase in expenditures was fueled by tuition 
increases that were also far above the inflation rate.
None of the colleges strayed from their primary mission of 
providing a liberal arts education to traditional students 
in a residential setting to meet enrollment goals.
The financial condition of each college varied but all 
were experiencing financial stress to some degree. The 
problems of the 1980s affected campus decision-making and 
management, and have caused the institutions to develop 
strategic plans for the future. In the end, the colleges 
studied showed that while they were experiencing some 
financial problems, like many American institutions they 
are constantly vulnerable yet persistently strong. Their 
strength depends largely on good management practices and 
administrative decision-making but they are always 
vulnerable to external conditions and factors beyond 
institutional control and the public policy agendas they 
can influence but not directly control.
vii
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Constantly Vulnerable Yet Persistently Strong 
A Study of the Financial Condition 
of the Liberal Arts College
Introduction
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The financial condition of colleges and universities 
and the factors influencing it have always been of concern 
to campus officials and often to government officials and 
the public as well. Since the college-building years of 
the 19th century to the post-growth period after higher 
education's "Golden Years," many colleges have maintained 
existence in a precarious financial balance. While it is 
always difficult to make sweeping generalizations about all 
colleges and universities, most studies have come to this 
conclusion. After their difficult beginnings a few 
colleges and universities enjoyed a steady flow of 
students, philanthropic dollars and government funds. But 
this does not characterize the majority of higher education 
institutions in America whose financial condition is 
subject to the changing external environment and the 
subsequent administrative decisions of campus officials.
In the 1970s several influential reports and research 
studies were published that identified an overall weakening 
financial condition at America's colleges and universities 
following the rapid growth years of the 1950s and 1960s.
By the end of the 1970s higher education analysts focused 
on the demographic changes that were predicted to cause 
enrollment declines and subsequently financial constraints 
for most colleges and universities. Consequently, in the
1980s many campus administrators faced the combined 
dilemmas of an already-eroded financial base and potential 
enrollment decline. Many higher education analysts 
maintained that the effects of these combined problems 
would have far-reaching consequences for even the strongest 
colleges and universities and lead to the demise of many 
weaker, less- established colleges and universities.
This study analyzes the income and expenditure 
patterns at three Liberal Arts I colleges in the Midwest.
It is a follow-up study that responds to Earl Cheit's 
landmark study, The New Depression in Higher Education 
sponsored by the Carnegie Foundation. It combines hard 
data from HEGIS/IPEDS reports and interviews with leading 
administrators to examine the effects the 1980s had on the 
institutions and makes a judgment about the financial 
condition of each college as they entered the 1990s. The 
study also examines the impact state, local and federal 
spending had as an income source and how the amount of 
public money that filtered down to these colleges varied 
over the decade. Lastly, it presents the administrators' 
policy views about solutions to help ensure a financially 
strong sector of liberal arts colleges, with the goal of 
maintaining these institutions as a viable option for 
students and preserving this diverse system of higher 
education, which is often considered the strength of higher 
education in the United States.
I. A Crisis Revisited: Actors, Factors and Trends
Contextual Framework: An American "System" of Higher 
Education
In his classic treatise on higher education, The Idea 
of a University. John Henry Cardinal Newman commented that 
"a university may be considered with reference to its 
Students or its Studies" {Newman, p. 74, 1959). By the 
time his treatise was written in the late 19th century, 
Newman's ideal university of a community of teachers and 
students was already unattainable for colleges and 
universities in the United States that were inextricably 
involved with service and research activities. The typical 
American college and university had become an "organized 
institution" unlike the medieval universities of Europe in 
which they were rooted. Practices begun centuries before, 
such as having organized faculties, formal courses of 
study, and granting certification through degrees, have 
endured to the present, but by the early twentieth century 
the American college and university had developed its own 
hybrid structure (Veysey, 1965).
The structure that we know today developed primarily 
from 1865 to 1910. Its evolution was marked by competing 
visions of piety and discipline vs. utility and research, 
and proponents of each debated the role and function of 
higher education in America. While the development of the
4
5overall "system" of American higher education was 
relatively unplanned, competing factions compromised to 
produce institutions involved in teaching, service, and 
research (Veysey, 1965) . Whereas Newman thought of an 
educational ideal of a community of scholars not involved 
in activities such as service and research, the expanded 
mission of colleges and universities required a great deal 
of organization which led to the expansion and importance 
of administration. Therefore, a university from the early 
twentieth century onward should not only be considered with 
reference to its "students or its studies" but also to its 
administration and the detailed functions of 
administration. Veysey points out that administrators, the 
people in the university community who characteristically 
thought about institutional management or of organizational 
planning, represented a measurable force in higher 
education that has continually grown since the turn of the 
century (Veysey p. 305, 1965) .
The complexity of colleges and universities and the 
structure that had developed was even further enhanced by 
the continued expansion of the American higher education 
system. Industrial society and the rapid development of 
large-scale business in the last two decades of the 19th 
century produced the need for engineers, accountants, 
economists, lawyers and other formally trained 
professionals. The ideal of the uneducated self-made man
6became less and less a reality and by the turn of the 
century there developed increasing acceptance of the need 
for college educated men, and corporate professionals were 
increasingly recruited out of the colleges (Hofstadter, 
1962). In addition, growth was enhanced by institutions 
of higher learning becoming inextricably intertwined with 
the greater goals of society. Public policy agendas 
throughout the twentieth century often targeted colleges 
and universities as a vehicle to promote social change and 
confront other national priorities. Consequently, growth 
and expansion have been hallmarks of American higher 
education and the "system" that developed.
The American higher education system that emerged is a 
diverse system compared with higher education in other 
industrialized nations. Many analysts maintain that the 
distinctiveness and strength of the system lies in the 
relative autonomy from governmental control that the 
institutions enjoy and the competitive nature of a system 
that encourages responsiveness to the needs of American 
citizens and society. This "competitive model" promotes 
diversity among institutions and encourages them to be 
venturesome and adaptable to changing societal needs (Bok, 
1986) .
The diversity fostered in a competitive 
decentralized system provides a variety and type of 
institutions, which prospective students and other clients
such as businesses, government organizations, and nonprofit 
organizations can choose from to gain services. These 
potential clients have a wide range of options including 
vocational schools, independent colleges and universities, 
religiously affiliated institutions, and public colleges 
and research universities. Independent colleges and 
universities represent integral components in this diverse 
"competitive" system of American higher education, because 
they currently comprise 55% of all colleges and 
universities and enroll 2.6 million students.
The 1600 private nonprofit colleges and universities 
in America are in many ways more diverse than the 
independent vs the public sector because marketplace 
pressures have forced them to adapt and change to meet 
individual and societal demands. Advocates for this sector 
maintain that they are vital contributors to society 
because they stimulate independence, autonomy, and 
diversity within higher education and serve important 
public purposes, largely with private sources. Carnegie 
classifications reveal a broad variety of types and sizes 
of independent institutions that provide economical 
services to individuals, businesses, local and state 
governments, and the nation.
In 1990, the Report of the Task Force on State Policy 
and Independent Higher Education, under sponsorship of the 
Education Commission of the States, highlighted some of the
significant contributions of private higher education. The 
Commission cited several significant research studies that 
revealed some of the important hallmarks of the independent 
sector. Independent colleges and universities have often 
led the way in providing access, choice and opportunities 
for students, which is considered one of the strengths of 
the American higher education system. They have played an 
important and historic role in educating minority students, 
currently enrolling approximately the same proportion as 
public institutions, and accounting for almost half of the 
historically black colleges. Independent colleges and 
universities also provide access to a wide range of 
socioeconomic groups by investing substantially ($22.6 
billion in 1988-89) in student aid programs. Because 95% 
of the nation's 600 liberal arts colleges and all but two 
of the 200 single-sex institutions are independently 
governed, potential students enjoy a wide range of choice 
in attendance, with opportunities to attend values-based 
religiously affiliated colleges and universities. With 60% 
of the first professional degrees, 36% of the bachelors 
degrees, and 37% of doctoral degrees granted by private 
colleges and universities, they effectively educate a 
disproportionate share of the nation's students considering 
the much smaller percentage of students that attend them. 
They also have significant economic and cultural impact on 
the communities they serve.
While it could be argued that the public sector could 
provide similar services and ranges of choice if the two 
sectors were to be amalgamated, estimates reveal that the 
burden on taxpayers could exceed $12 billion annually 
(Education Commission of the States, 1990). It could also 
reduce academic freedom in the public sector by taking away 
an outlet for faculty if oppression were to occur (Berdahl, 
1971}. Based on these observations, it is evident that a 
financially strong independent sector is very important if 
we are going to accept the belief that the strength of the 
American system of higher education, which is the envy many 
of the industrialized nations in the world, lies in its 
competitiveness based on choice and the ability to adapt 
and change to societal demands.
Enrollment and Financial Patterns and the Predicted Crisis 
of the 1980s
From 1870 to 1970 degree enrollments in colleges and 
universities doubled approximately every 14 or 15 years. 
During the 1950s and 1960s the rate of expansion was even 
faster. Several factors fueled the growth in this era, 
such as the G.I. Bill, the National Defense Education Act, 
the Post WWII baby boom, the need (or perceived need) for 
highly skilled workers, economic prosperity that allowed 
many families the discretionary income to pay for higher 
education, and public policies at the state and federal 
level to underwrite the education of millions (Finn, 1978) .
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The unprecedented rate of growth and expansion of the 
American higher education system in the 1950s and 1960s, 
often referred to as the Golden Years, had a significant 
impact on all sectors of the higher education system. The 
growth during this period had its greatest impact on the 
public colleges and universities but the enrollment gains 
also had significant effect on the growth of independent 
sector enrollments.
While the public sector absorbed the majority of the 
enrollment growth in the expansion from 1940-1970, by 1970, 
independent colleges and universities still outnumbered 
public institutions in twenty-nine states. Between 1950 
and 1980 more than 465 new independent institutions were 
established and full time equivalency enrollments in the 
private sector more than doubled from 1.1 to 2.5 million 
students (Berdahl, 1971). Even though enrollments in this 
era grew substantially for both sectors of American higher 
education system, the share of the overall percentage of 
students enrolled in private higher education declined.
In 1950, 50% of enrolled students attended independent 
college and universities. This percentage has steadily 
decreased with only 22% of enrolled students enrolling in 
the independent sector by 1990. Advocates for the 
independent sector maintain this continued trend has the 
potential to substantially reduce the historic role of the 
independent sector in the American higher education system
11
because of the influence enrollment has on the financial 
condition of higher education institutions. However, this 
is a misleading statistic. Despite the percentage decline 
of overall enrollments since 1950, independent colleges and 
universities had healthy enrollment gains, with the 
majority of growth in the public sector at the community 
college level and not at the four-year college level.
The periods of continued expansion in higher education 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s were predicted to end by the 
1970s and lead into a new era marked by enrollment decline 
and retrenchment for most colleges and universities. 
{Mortimer and Tierney,1979; Stadtman, 1980). This view was 
based on pessimistic enrollment projections and the eroded 
financial position of many colleges and universities as 
they entered an uncertain era beginning in 1970 and 
continuing into the 1990s.
In The New Depression in Higher Education (1971), 
Cheit presented a comprehensive study of the financial 
condition of 41 colleges and universities. He observed 
that expenditures at these institutions were rising faster 
than income and the resulting gap was putting them in a 
difficult financial position. Based on his sample of 41 
institutions, Cheit concluded that three-fifths of the 
nation's private colleges and universities were 
experiencing financial difficulties. According to Cheit, 
these financial problems did not represent isolated events
12
but were part of a general erosion of the financial 
position of most colleges and universities. He concluded 
that not all institutions were affected equally but all 
were affected to some degree.
Two years later, Cheit made a brief follow up of his 
original study. In The New Depression in Higher Education 
Two Years Later Cheit concluded that most of these 
institutions tentatively stabilized their financial 
condition. The "fragile stability" that he described when 
these campuses were reanalyzed was due largely to dramatic 
cost reductions and not to increased revenues (Cheit,
1973). The conclusion appropriately used the term 
"tentatively" because they were all headed for some very 
uncertain times throughout the remainder of the 1970s and 
into the 1980s. Other analysts identified the weakening 
financial condition of higher education institutions in 
the 1970s, especially among independent colleges and 
universities (Minter and Bowen, 1977; Jonsen, 1978; Lanier 
and Anderson, 1975; Lupton, Augenblick, Heyison, 1976). 
There was a lack of unanimity among the different reports, 
depending on which institutions were analyzed and which 
financial statistics were extracted. However, even those 
who did not recognize a financial "crisis" did see 
financial pressures as a growing problem, especially for 
the private sector. Baldridge et al. (1982) maintained 
that the problems of the 1980s would be more intense than
13
those in the 1970s due to the combined dilemmas of 
enrollment difficulties, financial problems, and reduced 
governmental support for higher education.
Not all the analyses concluded that the financial 
position of colleges and universities had eroded during the 
high inflation years of the 1970s. The final report of the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Three 
Thousand Futures: The Next Twenty Years for Higher 
Education (1981), challenged more conventional wisdom that 
the 1970s was a decade of "disaster." According to the 
report, higher education entered the 1980s from a 
relatively high level of performance, not a badly-weakened 
situation, and was generally in a position of substantial 
strength as it faced the future. But the Carnegie 
Council's study, like many others, focused more on 
aggregate data and did not include in-depth analysis of 
single institutions as did the other studies that presented 
a more dismal state of affairs, especially for certain 
sectors of the higher education system.
Regardless of how the situation was viewed at the end 
of the 1970s, the financial strength of most institutions 
ultimately depended on either enrollment stability or 
enrollment growth, or some capacity to generate needed 
revenues in lieu of enrollment growth and the increased 
revenues it provides. For the first time in recent history, 
most college and university administrators confronted the
14
challenge of managing an organization with declining or 
reduced revenues. Campus administrators faced enrollment 
projections and uncertain governmental support that were a 
cause for concern.
They were encouraged by leading analysts to adopt 
retrenchment strategies and reduce expenditures to account 
for the possibility of decreasing income. This was truly a 
challenge because as Finn (1978) pointed out, colleges and 
universities had mastered the challenges of growth in the 
1950s and 1960s and were ill-equipped to contract. He 
maintained that despite stronger management and greater 
willingness among campus leaders to face tough decisions, 
colleges and universities decentralized decision-making 
process, high fixed costs, and personnel practices makes 
retrenchment strategies very difficult to implement. 
Furthermore, the misunderstood feature of enrollment driven 
formuli is that they are intended only for starting-up and 
growth periods and they do not work well and were not 
intended to work in times of contraction (Thelin, 1989) .
In the early 1970s many demographic analysts were 
predicting sharp declines in the number of high school 
graduates beginning in the late 1970s and continuing well 
into the 1990s. But not everyone agreed, and Bowen (1974) 
was optimistic about enrollment trends in the 1980s and 
projected increases. Bowen's conclusions were based on the 
view that growth in the service sector of the economy would
cause increased demand for college graduates and therefore 
increases in the overall percentage of the population 
pursuing higher education. Even if his analysis was 
accurate, an overall increase in the population attending 
higher education, especially among nontraditional students, 
would provide little relief for many institutions. Private 
liberal arts colleges that rely on traditional-aged 
students and have a mission to provide the "traditional" 
college experience to this group would reap few of the 
benefits of the expansion envisioned by the more optimistic 
observers unless they were to alter their mission and 
raison d'etre.
Therefore, the majority of the forecasts that 
projected a doom and gloom scenario were of concern to a 
substantial group of colleges and universities and these 
institutions were predominantly from the independent 
sector. Numerous studies projected annual declines during 
the first half of the 1980s (Cartter, 1976; Dresch, 1975; 
Froomkin, 1974; Freeman, 1976). Freeman (1976) and Cartter 
(1976) projected continuing but smaller decreases in the 
last half of the 1980s, while Froomkin (1974) and Dresch 
(1975) predicted continuing decreases into the 1990s.
One of the most moderate and noteworthy projections 
based on all of the demographic data was presented by The 
Carnegie Council for the Advancement of Teaching in 1980. 
Their observations were significant because of the
16
organization's high respectability among policy makers and 
campus administrators. They estimated an overall decline 
in enrollments within a range of 5 to 15 percent between 
1981 and 1996. According to the Carnegie Council's 
analysis the 23 percent decline of 18-24 year olds by 1997, 
projected by the U.S. Bureau of Census, would be offset by 
an increase in older students, nonminority women, and 
minority populations as well as efforts to stem attrition.
While the mildly optimistic projection of the Carnegie 
Foundation and Bowen projections could have provided some 
security and relief for a number of institutions, many 
colleges and universities would be hard pressed to maintain 
their historic mission of serving traditional students. 
Therefore, an important actor in the diverse system of 
higher education faced serious financial threat due to 
their efforts to attract a diminishing clientele. Liberal 
arts colleges whose reputation depended on selective 
admissions and socioeconomic and ethnic diversity were 
especially threatened. Even if the overall percentage of 
high school graduates increased to make up for overall 
graduation rate declines there would still be a smaller 
pool of top students from which to select.
The decline of high school graduates was not predicted 
to affect all geographic areas or institutions equally. 
Private colleges and universities, especially those that 
relied heavily on traditional-age students, were predicted
17
to be hurt the most in the 1980s. The most adversely 
affected institutions were less selective liberal arts 
colleges and mid-size private universities in the Midwest 
and Northeast (Carnegie Council for the Advancement of 
Teaching, 1981; Jansen,1978; Baldridge et. al., 1982; 
Mayhew, 1983; Riesman, 1987). The problems expected were 
due not only to pessimistic enrollment projections but also 
because of the financial state of most colleges and 
universities as they entered the uncertain decades of the 
1980s and early 1990s. Mayhew (1983) further maintained 
that the combination of rising costs and decreasing high 
school graduation rates would provide problems for even the 
strongest institutions. Consequently, most independent 
colleges and universities faced an uncertain future and 
many new challenges associated with, and in anticipation 
of, the alleged decline of traditional age college students 
and declining enrollments combined with an already eroded 
financial base. The impact of these predicted enrollment 
trends and the financial condition of this sector has 
implications for the American system of higher education as 
a whole.
Public Policy and Funding in an Uncertain Era
Although the American system of higher education is 
often described as competitive, it can be more accurately 
characterized as an industry of uneven competition, with 
private institutions at a competitive disadvantage due to
the "tuition gap" that exists between public and private 
institutions. The existence of publicly-subsidized 
colleges and universities greatly influences the nature of 
competition in higher education. These imposed price 
differentials shelter public institutions from competition 
with private institutions as well as with public 
institutions in other states, where non-resident students 
pay tuition rates higher than that of state residents.
This leaves private colleges and universities to 
compete among themselves for the students and families who 
remain committed to attending institutions that often 
provide a different service and function than that of the 
public sector. This results in inefficient and more costly 
than necessary provisions of educational services. Public 
institutions often duplicate programs and services already 
provided by independent institutions. Price differentials 
can influence student choice and induce them to choose the 
"wrong school" for purely financial reasons. McPherson and 
Schapiro (1991) concluded that price not only can but does 
have significant influence on college choice and therefore 
student body composition. The "tuition gap" that results 
from state subsidies to public colleges and universities 
has increased from 1973 to 1988 and has made the system 
increasingly less competitive. As private institutions 
struggle to maintain their enrollment share the tuition gap 
threatens their financial viability (Fischer, 1990).
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Increasing economic distress in many private 
institutions and a push by the federal government combined 
to make state relations with private higher education of 
emerging importance (Berdahl, 1971). Educational leaders 
in the private sector feared private colleges and 
universities would absorb most of the retrenchment in the 
1980s, so they turned to state and federal governments for 
policies that would help them fend off prospective decline 
(Breneman and Finn, 1978). Over forty states have 
independent college and university associations and most of 
them have had some success in obtaining funding for 
portable scholarships that help close some of the "tuition 
gap." Also, federal programs such as Pell Grants and BEOG 
are applicable to students at independent colleges. State 
grants sometimes help close the tuition gap, but these 
programs vary widely among states and in general still fall 
short of removing the significant tuition gap between 
public and private colleges and universities even when 
combined with federal programs. These programs are 
significant in that they are visible evidence of "private" 
inclusion in "public" policy and represent a commitment to 
the financial support of independent colleges and 
universities and recognition of their role in the higher 
education system.
Financial support of private colleges and 
universities with public revenues has historical precedence
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as state governments saw the need to assist financially 
struggling colleges in the 18th and 19th centuries. Most 
New England and Middle Atlantic states gave substantial 
subsidies to privately-controlled colleges and 
universities. But as the country expanded west, the 
tradition of public higher education became stronger, which 
was augmented by the Morrill Act of 1862, Some state's 
constitutions included provisions against state aid to 
sectarian institutions, the most prevalent form of private 
higher education in the 19th century, and in some cases 
this prohibition extended to all private institutions 
(Berdahl, 1971). But the exclusionary policies identified 
by Berdahl were generally short-lived and would not last, 
because independent colleges and universities were 
recognized by state governments as essential to meeting the 
educational demands of a growing nation as well as 
economies that increasingly required an educated public. 
This led to state cooperation to some degree with private 
colleges and universities in almost every state.
During the rapid growth years of the 1950s and 1960s 
state officials recognized that limited aid to independent 
institutions was a feasible solution to meeting educational 
demands that were overcrowding public institutions 
(Gregory, 1984) . After WWII the task facing state 
legislators was to provide accessible and affordable higher 
education to citizens. The legislators were able to
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accomplish this more expeditiously with already-established 
independent colleges and universities, as well as with low 
tuition state colleges and universities, rather than 
building state campuses.
While there were less tangible reasons for state 
support of independent colleges and universities, such as 
providing diversity, choice, and access, practical concerns 
helped proponents of independent higher education argue for 
increased funding. Once begun, it became difficult to 
withdraw public funds even in the 1980s when overcrowded 
conditions at public universities began to wane (Gregory, 
1984) . These institutions had become a significant source 
of employment and cultural centers in areas that often had 
no other such source. These practical considerations 
probably outweighed the less tangible goals.
The general types of aid used by states to provide 
support for independent colleges and universities includes 
direct aid to institutions and indirect aid that goes to 
the students. The predominant programs in most states are 
student assistance programs, because of constitutional 
restrictions on direct aid by states as well as 
constitutional limitations on the states in terms of the 
use of their credit authority. Many states have avoided 
this limitation by creating tax free-bonds, selling 
authorities not based on state credit (Gregory, 1984).
The predominant forms of direct state aid to
22
institutions include: contracts for the provision of 
educational services not provided by the state, including 
but not limited to programs in medicine and veterinary 
medicine; direct grants to institutions; provision of funds 
from the sale of bonds for construction or other capital 
projects; tax exemptions on property; sales and income tax 
exemptions; tax credits to individuals and corporations 
that make charitable contributions; categorical grants for 
projects such as library sharing and other forms of 
interinstitutional cooperation; and space rental 
agreements. But the most popular and constitutionally 
acceptable form of assistance from states is that given to 
students attending independent colleges and universities 
(Gregory, 1984). This aid takes the form of need-based and 
merit-based portable financial aid programs that provide 
grants to students attending the college of their choice 
within the state (a few states allow state money to be 
carried across state lines). Many states also provide loan 
and work-study programs for students.
By 1985, the National Center for Educational 
Statistics published data that revealed that direct state 
and local governments were contributing $30.6 billion in 
current-fund revenues to higher educational institutions, 
while the federal government was subsidizing $9 billion 
through title IV student aid programs. The period from 
1970 onward marks a changing relationship between higher
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education and the government. Colleges and universities 
that once survived in relative isolation from government 
control increasingly had governments becoming involved in 
campus affairs as higher education became central to 
achieving state and national objectives (Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 1982). 
Government control and influence also increased with 
accountability expected for the tax dollars that flowed to 
colleges and universities.
There was a need to bring independent colleges and 
universities into the fold of state policy and planning due 
to the significant percentage of students still enrolled in 
this sector, the overall large number of these institutions 
that were experiencing financial difficulty, and state and 
local governments spending an average of three times the 
federal government on higher education. In some instances, 
independent colleges stood to gain from not being fully 
involved in state planning if they quietly and effectively 
gained programs that were secure; that is, by staying out 
of the fray of arguments, they could be overlooked during 
cutbacks. But ultimately, this avoidance and limited 
partnership tends to be an ineffective long-term strategy 
(Thelin, 1989) .
In the early 1970s several federal programs pushed for 
public-private cooperation at the state level. Ultimately 
section 1202 of the 1972 Federal Higher Education Act
called for existing or new state agencies to develop 
long-range comprehensive plans with explicit provisions for 
including independent colleges and universities with public 
systems. But nearly a decade later it had been observed 
that "no 1202 commission has matched the promise of the 
original legislation, due to opposition of institutions and 
systems, the uncertainty of continued state and federal 
funds, and inadequate staff" (Odell and Thelin, 1981, p.
60). With the failure of the measures to bring private 
colleges and universities into the fold of planning and the 
uncertainty about future federal, state, and local 
subsidies, the financial strength of independent colleges 
and universities largely depended on their ability to 
confront the impending financial and enrollment problems of 
the 1980s and early 1990s internally with improved 
financial management, increased marketing, aggressive fund 
raising campaigns, and lobbying local, state, and federal 
governments for increased support.
This was accentuated by changing federal policy, with 
the Education Amendments of 1972 shifting federal financial 
assistance from direct awards to individual institutions to 
students through portable student financial aid programs. 
Pell Grants became the main source of federal aid, 
especially at liberal arts colleges that traditionally have 
not brought in large amounts of federal research dollars. 
According to McPherson and Schapiro (1991), as a revenue
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source Pell has fluctuated and this has had significant 
financial impact on small private colleges. Between 1973 
and 1980 there was a rapid growth in the Pell program and 
the Guaranteed Student Loan program but between 1980 and 
19984 there was a decline in federal spending for the Pell 
program with a substantial rise in the Guaranteed Student 
Loan program.
In the early years of the Pell program, the vast 
majority of the money went to traditional students, but 
since 1980 federal aid increases have disproportionately 
gone to independent students, who are mostly nontraditional 
adult students (McPherson and Schapiro, 1991). This is a 
drain on federal funding for traditional students and 
therefore has a significant impact on one sector of the 
higher education system -- the private liberal arts 
colleges. These institutions have experienced a 78% rise 
in institution-based aid to make up for declining 
government support and according to McPherson and Schapiro 
this has fueled much of the tuition increases at 
independent institutions. This was compounded by a shift 
of federal spending from grant money to an increasing 
dependence on government-backed loan programs as a means of 
financial support.
One of the cornerstones of the Pell grant program 
enacted in 1972 rests on complementing state 
appropriations. On the average, state and local
governments spend more than three times than the federal 
government does on higher education. State and local 
governments have increased student financial aid revenues 
every year since 1977, reflecting the expansion of old 
programs and the creation of new ones (Fischer, 1990). But 
inflation eroded much of the value of increased aid. It is 
alleged that Pell no longer addresses the threshold problem 
and that too many students, especially the poor, are having 
to borrow heavily to finance their education due to reduced 
target efficiency of the Pell grant program throughout the 
1980s (Fischer, 1990).
As already noted, this period was marked by a shift in 
federal policy with the Education Amendments of 1972 
shifting federal financial assistance from direct awards to 
individual institutions to students through portable 
student financial aid programs. One of the effects of 
portable student financial aid and the "incentive" or 
"consumer model" in an era of projected enrollment decline 
was increasing competition among institutions to attract 
qualified students who could bring with them portable state 
and federal dollars, as well as general tuition revenues 
from non-need students. To make their campuses more 
attractive to prospective students, many private colleges 
and universities responded by improving and expanding 
facilities, increasing services available to students, and 
increasing student financial aid expenditures (O'Keefe,
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1987; Bok, 1986) . All of these measures can be very- 
costly, requiring colleges and universities to generates 
revenue to pay for growing expenditures not necessarily 
directly associated with the central purpose of the 
institution -- teaching and learning. Given that 
instructional spending did increase at many independent 
colleges, the combined effects of reduced government 
assistance and competition for a dwindling supply of 
students has led to rapid tuition increases.
Higher Education Responds
The nature of higher education analysis shifted during 
this period of higher education history from attention to 
relationships between higher education and social problems 
to new pressing concerns about the declining traditional 
college age population and institutional financial crises 
(Shulman, 1977). Much of the literature on higher 
education in the late 1970s and 1980s concentrated on 
potential enrollment decline and the financial retrenchment 
independent colleges and universities would face and how 
they could effectively respond to meet the challenges and 
survive in a period of uncertainty. There was also 
emphasis placed on the potential effect of federal, state, 
and local government policies on this sector of the higher 
education system.
Many campus leaders took the doom and gloom 
predictions seriously and focused on methods to insure
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institutional survival. Certainly colleges and 
universities had faced enrollment problems and shifts 
before, but the combined problems of predicted enrollment 
shrinkage, financial pressures, and increased governmental 
involvement in the affairs of independent colleges and 
universities were unique to the decades following the 1970s 
(Mortimer and Tierney, 1979). The terms marketing, 
strategic planning, and scientific management had 
traditionally been considered dirty words among many higher 
educational professionals, and in general, colleges and 
universities had refused to adopt modern management 
techniques (Keller, 1983). The incompatibility of 
strategic planning and marketing at higher educational 
institutions waned in the past decade, due to changes in 
the external and internal environments faced by most 
college and university decision-makers. College and 
university administrators were encouraged to embrace 
concepts of strategic planning and marketing as a means to 
avoid enrollment problems and possible financial collapse.
A type of "Heisenberg Effect" resulted as college and 
university administrators made proactive efforts to attack 
the predicted and pending problems associated with the 
1980s. The focus of literature intended for administrators 
and faculty leaders provided programs of strategies and 
procedures for insuring institutional survival. The 
changing nature of administrative response caused by new
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internal and external pressures could be viewed as a 
catalyst for a "management revolution" in higher education.
Higher educational analysts responded to the 
pessimistic enrollment projections and impending financial 
problems with expert advice and recommendations to follow 
for institutional survival. Entire companies such as 
Jossey-Bass, Inc. were founded to publish works geared to a 
new growing clientele of university administrators. 
Demographic trends that predicted enrollment declines, 
especially at private colleges and universities, caused 
many administrators to make difficult decisions often 
regarding the heart of the institution's principle mission 
of providing a liberal arts education to traditional-age 
students.
To maintain this goal and attract the dwindling supply 
of students, colleges intensified their recruitment and 
retention programs. They often spent large sums of money 
and put an increasing emphasis on strategic planning and 
institutional marketing. They also invested more funds 
into promotional publications and often hired outside 
advertising firms and marketing consultants to assist them 
in developing these materials (Camper, 1990). In his 
analysis O'Keefe (1987) concluded that competition has been 
the underlying factor increasing college costs. According 
to O'Keefe, "we improve programs and expand student 
services not because of some atavistic need to expand the
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enterprise but because we feel our students want and will 
go elsewhere if we do not provide... improved instruction, 
enhanced counseling programs, help in obtaining financial 
aid, and access to computers and other up-to-date 
technology are surefire draws for students and their 
parents (p.33, 1987). When efforts failed to attract 
traditional students they increasingly targeted new 
clienteles such as part-time, transfer, and adult students 
in their recruitment efforts to bring in needed revenues in 
a desperate search for customers, causing many to lose 
their sense of mission (Riesman, 1987).
Many of these new students were recruited into weekend 
and evening programs designed to cater to new student 
populations (Mackey, 1980). Chaffee (1984) described two 
models of strategic management in response to financial 
decline based on a study of 14 private colleges. The 
"adaptive model" views the organization as one that changes 
products and services to maintain resources for survival. 
The "interpretive" strategy model presents a constantly 
changing organization that requires management, maintenance 
of credibility, and commitment of participants in order to 
survive. Chaffee concluded that most successful colleges 
follow a combination of adaptive and interpretive 
strategies. She maintained that interpretive strategies 
should guide adaptive, which requires a commitment to the 
institution's mission. This strong commitment to an
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institution's historic mission in a period of decline is 
essential to long-term strength (Mortimer and 
Tierney,1979).
Time for Another Look
Contemporary research reveals that college and 
university enrollments actually increased from 11.3 million 
in 1978 to 12.5 million in 1987. Many of the independent 
colleges and universities that were predicted to have 
enrollment declines due to the decreases in high school 
graduation rates actually had headcount enrollment 
increases and large percentage gains from 1978-87 
(O'Keefe,1989). The research conducted by O'Keefe dispels 
the conventional wisdom that enrollments would decline and 
private colleges and universities would experience severe 
financial problems due to enrollment shortfalls. His 
analysis dealt with the quantitative measure of headcount 
enrollment and took a qualitative look at strategic 
responses to the external environment. It was a 
significant study because it questioned the accuracy of the 
predictions of the late 1970s and analyzed what occurred at 
several independent colleges throughout the 1980s. It is 
time to take closer look at the overall costs to an 
important segment of our diverse system of higher 
education, the selective liberal arts college, that has a 
defined mission to educate traditional college-age 
students, full-time, in traditional liberal arts
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disciplines, within a residential setting.
The measures that were used by many schools to 
maintain their enrollment shares and selectivity often came 
at substantial financial cost to the individual 
institutions, which was compounded by reduced governmental 
support. Liberal arts colleges whose reputation depended 
on selective admissions and socioeconomic and ethnic 
diversity were not necessarily part of the overall 
enrollment gain and the financial security it can provide. 
Many were subject to the cost-income squeeze that many 
analysts identified as early as the early 1970s. Their 
mission of providing low student-faculty ratios, small 
classes, and individualized instruction would not allow 
them to solve their financial problems through enrollment 
growth without having a qualitative impact on the 
institution. Even if the overall percentage of high school 
graduate increased to make up for overall graduation rate 
declines, there would still be a smaller pool of top 
students from which to select unless the schools lowered 
their admission standards.
As O'Keefe's research pointed out, many institutions 
were able to effectively market their institutions and take 
advantage of what Bowen accurately predicted--the increase 
of the percentage of the American high school population 
entering higher education. But the impact of these efforts 
to many schools were significant in that many of these
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students were less prepared and required costly additional 
services. These schools often had to spend vast amounts of 
money in other areas ranging from financial aid to student 
services and facilities to keep their institutions 
attractive to potential students. Many institutions this 
translated into altering their primary mission.
The conventional wisdom that having a competitive 
admissions position would be an asset in the 1980s in terms 
of enrollment stability often held true, but enrollment 
levels are only one aspect of the overall financial 
stability of an institution. Simply looking at enrollment 
figures does not reveal the costs incurred to maintain 
those enrollments. The costs can not only be evaluated in 
terms of expenditures but also by the effects on academic 
programs, nonacademic programs, and the overall mission of 
an institution. As McPherson and Schapiro (1991) pointed 
out, a higher educational institution's objectives can 
readily be attributed to resource allocation. Closer 
qualitative analysis would reveal how individual 
institutions maintained their enrollments and competitive 
position. This is warranted because the 1990s are expected 
to be another challenging period for independent colleges.
As far back as 1970 the diminishing of real diversity 
was identified as campuses copied one another and added 
comprehensive programs in response to consumer demands 
(Hodgkinson, 1970). As one noted authority recently
observed, "The liberal arts college as we know it is 
disappearing from the landscape, and another type of 
institution -- the professional college -- is taking its 
place. Furthermore, I believe that most educators are not 
aware of this "sea change," nor have we begun to debate its 
significance. The diversity of American higher education, 
one of its oft-noted and much-valued attributes, will be 
much reduced if these small private colleges are unable to 
sustain themselves and their mission because of changing 
economic circumstances" (Breneman p. 17, 1990).
The declining enrollment share and changing funding 
patterns for private higher education have had a 
significant impact on liberal arts colleges and threaten 
the diversity and strength of our system of higher 
education. There is a strong need to examine the recent 
history of the liberal arts college sector, that includes 
the forces that have brought about change at many of them 
(Breneman, 1990). The studies that have been conducted 
often analyze aggregate data to make broad conclusions, 
but there remains scarcity in the study of higher education 
that includes microeconomic analysis of single institutions 
and rigorous studies of campus finance (Keller, 1989; 
O'Keefe 1987). Considering that 57% of university 
administrators at baccalaureate institutions cite 
maintaining adequate finances and 31% cite maintaining 
enrollment as major challenges for the next five years
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according to a 1992 Chronicle of Higher Education survey, 
further research is needed to determine the financial 
condition of the private liberal arts colleges and how they 
have responded to administrative challenges that they faced 
in the 1980s.
The independent sector is important segment because it 
enhances diversity among and within institutions and 
strengthens the market competition that has made the 
American system of higher education the envy of the world. 
Because the issue of financial strength has strong public 
policy implications there is a need for studies to go 
beyond determining the financial condition of these 
colleges to also focus on the policy issue of public 
funding for independent colleges. The role state and 
federal aid has played in the financing of these schools 
needs to be examined within this context to further 
understand the impact that it has on their financial 
condition.
The potential of declining enrollments due to the 
decrease in high school graduates has had significant 
impact on liberal arts colleges. Considering that revenues 
of independent institutions grew steadily in late 1970s, 
slowed in the early 1980s, and since 1983 have been 
increasing around 9 to 10 percent annually, it is important 
to understand the internal and external factors that have 
affected colleges from this sector (Carnegie Foundation for
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the Advancement of Teaching, 1988). Many have to had add 
new clienteles and programs in an effort to survive and 
prosper in an era of increasing financial pressure and 
declining number of traditional-age students. Increasing 
enrollments, reducing entrance requirements, adding new 
divisions and students, and reducing academic programs and 
non-academic services are common responses by institutions 
in financial trouble (Cheit, 1971). When these types of 
measures are taken by liberal arts colleges they impact 
their central mission and threaten to erode the diversity 
and strength of our system of higher education.
II. The Anatomy of an Organization
The Purpose of the Study
The contributions of the liberal arts colleges to 
society are significant and it is important for 
administrators and policy makers to learn the impact of the 
changing external environment on their financial strength 
and if they were able to confront the challenges of this 
decade. Therefore, the purpose of this study is to 
systematically analyze the organizational health of a group 
of selective independent liberal arts colleges during the 
period from 1980 to 1990. The approach resurrects the kind 
of analytic tests and indices introduced in 1971 by 
economist Earl Cheit in his influential study, The New 
Depression in Higher Education. While Cheit's analysis of 
financial health focused on representative schools from a 
variety of institutional types, this study follows up on 
one subsector, the private liberal arts college. Because 
this issue has strong public policy implications, the study 
goes beyond determining the financial condition of these 
colleges by also focusing on the policy issue of public 
funding for independent colleges. The role state and local 
aid has played in the financing of these schools is 
examined as a subsidiary research question, in order to 
further understand the impact the assistance has had on 
their financial condition and how this funding has changed
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over the decade of the 1980s.
From a case study approach the issue of government 
funding can be examined, not from an aggregate view, as 
most studies of funding for higher education have examined 
it, but from a more focused view that explores how state 
and federal funds have filtered down to this segment of the 
higher education system. The shift in initiative from the 
federal governments to the states as well as the 
renaissance of state leadership in the field of education 
makes this aspect of the issue of financial health even 
more relevant (Finn, 1990) . Specifically, this study 
examines the following research questions:
1. Have private liberal arts colleges been able to keep up 
with rising costs as they attempt to remain a competitive 
entity with other institutions of higher learning and what 
is their present financial condition?
2 . Have they responded to their financial and enrollment 
dilemmas with cost-cutting measures as Cheit concluded?
3. Are there financial difficulties based on comparisons 
of income v s . expenditures and what is the reason for the 
rapid increase in costs?
4. How are the institutions responding to a changing 
external environment?
5. How have liberal arts colleges raised the revenues 
necessary to balance budgets and meet rising costs? Was it 
accomplished through enrollment increases that have the
potential to reduce quality?
6. What has been the role of state, federal, and local 
governments in supporting this sector?
7. Has the external environment caused private liberal 
arts colleges to stray from their primary mission and 
selective admissions policies in an effort to increase 
revenues and maintain enrollments?
8. What policies do administrators at these institutions 
recommend for solving the financial problems of liberal 
arts colleges?
The Research Design and Configuration of the Data
The research design for this longitudinal study uses 
historical and statistical data in which institutional 
policies, practices, and outcomes are analyzed in terms of 
external demographic and policy factors. A case study 
approach analyzing a group of institutions that are 
representative of selective private liberal arts colleges 
is utilized because rigorous studies of campus finance of 
single institutions scarcely exist in higher education 
research (Keller, 1989). Furthermore, our attention is 
often preoccupied with a few "name brand" schools that loom 
in the national consciousness. Recent articles in the New 
York Times such as "Even in the Ivy League, Cutbacks Are 
the Rule," and "Bad Times Force Universities to Rethink 
What They Are" center our attention on the Ivies, Stanford, 
Northwestern and other top research universities. Rarely
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are the small liberal arts colleges mentioned. The same is 
true in other popular magazines like Time. While the 
February, 1992 article "Big Chill on Campus" brought 
attention to the financial squeeze impacting institutions 
such as Yale, Columbia, and several flagship universities, 
the liberal arts colleges are all but neglected.
These articles highlight the problems that are 
developing, but rigorous financial studies of the recent 
past that are the historic root of these problems are 
missing in higher education literature, as Keller pointed 
out in 1989. This study goes beyond this limited view that 
excludes many of the actors in an educational enterprise 
that has become a $100 billion enterprise. It focuses on 
colleges that are classified Liberal Arts I colleges by the 
Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching. There 
were 142 Liberal Arts I Colleges as of the late 1980s. It 
includes a sample of participants from the nine liberal 
arts colleges analyzed in Cheit's The New Depression in 
Higher Education. They include Beloit College, Carleton 
College, and Knox College. These institutions were chosen 
because Cheit's comprehensive financial study of them prior 
to the decade of the 1980s provides a base point for 
analysis. In Cheit's study each of these schools was 
labeled as either "in financial trouble or headed for 
trouble."
Even though they are not a random sample, the study
can produce significant results and an understanding of 
Liberal Arts I colleges. These institutions are 
significant because they all are located in the Midwest, a 
geographic region predicted to be hardest hit financially 
by demographic changes. In general, they share the similar 
institutional characteristics of Liberal Arts I colleges 
across the country, such as selectivity, size, student body 
composition, and programs of study. The Carnegie 
Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching defines Liberal 
Arts I as institutions that are highly selective, primarily 
undergraduate colleges that award more than half of their 
baccalaureate degrees in arts and sciences fields. The 
most recent classification was published in 1987 and is 
based on institutional data covering 1982 through 1985.
The colleges are also all members of a consortium of peer 
institutions, the Associated Colleges of the Midwest.
Their financial condition today and how they responded to 
the challenges of the 1980s can provide campus 
administrators and policy makers a historical perspective 
on how to approach future financial and enrollment problems 
that are plaguing college campuses across the country.
As noted, the sample is not representative from a 
statistical sense, but findings can be used to make broader 
conclusions about the financial condition of private 
liberal arts colleges and how external factors have 
influenced administrative decision-making. Although the
findings do not necessarily warrant conclusions about all 
private liberal arts colleges, (again, they are only 
representative of Carnegie Classification Liberal Arts I 
colleges) they do allow for certain generalizations about 
common problems affecting this specific segment of the 
American system of higher education and what led to these 
problems from a historical perspective. This type of study 
can help guide both decision-makers at the campus and 
public policy making level as to how they can best react to 
changing external factors that affect this type of 
institution. Because each of these colleges comes from 
states with varying state policies and funding patterns 
toward private higher education, the study can help policy 
analysts understand the financial needs of this segment of 
the higher education system and how state spending has 
filtered down to the campus level.
All of them are affected in one way or another by 
federal policy and funding. Specifically, the study also 
tests one of the conclusions made about government funding 
and its effects on institutions of higher learning by 
McPherson and Schapiro in Keeping College Affordable.
Based on the results of the study, they concluded that 
there are direct relationships between increases in state 
and local spending and instructional spending. Because 
their analysis was done using national aggregate data 
McPherson and Schapiro were unable to make statistically
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reliable conclusions regarding the impact of state and 
local appropriations to private institutions. While these 
case studies will not produce statistically significant 
results either, they do provide greater understanding of 
the impact state and local expenditures have had on private 
liberal arts colleges and their financing patterns.
In the first phase of the study general income and 
expenditure information for the decade of the 1980s is 
analyzed. These data are gathered from the Higher 
Education General Information Survey (HEGIS) and its 
successor the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data 
System (IPEDS). Brubaker (1979) extensively reviewed both 
the reported accuracy and validity of HEGIS data and 
concluded that they have continually improved over time and 
represent the primary data base for higher education 
research. As Thelin and Krotseng pointed out, "HEGIS and 
IPEDS have become the lifeblood of our contemporary effort 
to report the condition and character of higher education 
(1989, p.18)." By using historical HEGIS/IPEDS, the 
present condition of the college campus can be understood 
by connecting it to its recent past. For the purpose of 
analyzing indicators of financial health, this study is 
interested primarily in the HEGIS/IPEDS financial data. 
Because interpreting HEGIS/IPEDS data presents certain 
pitfalls, such as the possibility of incorrectly 
interpreting the data as well as accounting for the
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somewhat ambiguous reporting structure of HEGIS/IPEDS 
reports, this information is "triangulated" or verified by 
other sources. Therefore, in the second phase of the study 
information is obtained through discussions with senior 
administrators {see appendix A for interview guide). The 
administrators were provided interview questions in advance 
to allow them adequate time to prepare thoughtful responses 
to questions that illuminate and verify findings from 
HEGIS/IPEDS data. To maintain the integrity of Cheit's 
original study the same interviewing guide was used in this 
study.
Expenditures are grouped into the following HEGIS/ 
IPEDS categories: (see Appendix B for a definition of the 
HEGIS/IPEDS expenditure categories).
a. Educational and general expenditures.
b. Instruction.
c. Research.
d. Public service.
e . Academic support.
f . Student services.
g. Institutional support.
h. Operations and plant maintenance.
i . Institutional scholarships and grants. 
k. Independent operations.
Increases or decreases per student in each of the 
categories reveals changes in institutional priorities and
45
practices. As McPherson and Schapiro (1991) pointed out, a 
higher educational institutions objectives can readily be 
attributed to resource allocation. For example, a decline 
in the proportion that is spent on academic activities such 
as instruction, research and academic support reveals a 
declining emphasis on academic activities and an increasing 
budgetary emphasis on administrative activities can 
indicate that the institution is working harder to survive 
within the changing external environment. Trends in 
student-faculty ratios are also analyzed. Increases in 
student-faculty ratios and overall decreases in faculty 
often correlate with program cutbacks as well as 
restrictions on special course offerings. These types of 
cutbacks are identified as indicators of an institution in 
or headed for financial trouble. In addition, increasing 
the use of part-time faculty and reducing tenured faculty 
positions are indicators of financial stress.
The IPEDS enrollment survey provides information on 
changes in the clientele served by a college. Improved 
services signify an emphasis on student retention through 
improved counseling and academic advising and the need to 
offer such services to make their campuses more attractive 
to potential students. Increases in scholarships and 
fellowships, especially merit based, would reveal the need 
for an institution to offer price subsidies to attract top 
students and maintain a competitive price as the tuition
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gap between public and private institutions widens.
Overall enrollment growth without proportionate increases 
in faculty and instructional expenditures indicates a 
weakening financial position from an income vs. expenditure 
standpoint. The study also uses HEGIS/IPEDS data to reveal 
shifts in academic program emphasis and the clienteles 
served, by focusing on changes in degrees offered to see if 
these institutions are becoming "professional colleges" and 
abandoning their original mission.
Institutional income figures were gathered from 
HEGIS/IPEDS data and presented in the following categories: 
(for a description of the HEGIS/IPEDS income categories see 
appendix B)
a. Federal grants and contracts.
b. Federal student financial aid.
c. State grants and contracts.
d. State student financial aid,
e. Local government grants and contracts.
f . Tuition and fees.
g. Private gifts and grants.
h. Auxiliary enterprises,
i Endowment income.
j . Other sources.
These data combined with information on expenditures 
reveals why tuitions have increased dramatically, which 
caused these institutions to be less competitive from a
price standpoint. Increases in institutional student 
financial aid can reveal a decreased role of government as 
a revenue source and a need to try to become more price 
competitive to attract the most qualified students. This 
information will highlight the widening tuition gap that is 
placing private liberal arts colleges in a less competitive 
position in the marketplace and a therefore a relatively 
weakened financial state. Fluctuations in support from 
federal, state, and local governments and increased income 
from private gifts, auxiliary enterprises, and endowments 
shows an increased emphasis on financial management and 
revenue generation.
The study begins with the academic year 1979-80 
because that is the year that high school graduation rates 
began to steadily decline, and it ends with 1989-90 because 
it is the most recent year for which the data are 
available. The amounts spent by each institution per 
full-time-equivalent undergraduate student (FTE) were 
calculated and presented for 1978-79 through 1989-90. All 
the figures and percentage changes are presented in 
constant (1979) dollars to control for inflation and 
chances in the overall economy, based on Consumer Price 
Index (CPI). All of the total income sources are also 
presented in constant dollars (1979) and account for all 
income sources for each institution. The income changes 
are used to highlight changes in sources of financial
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support as an impact on overall financial health. 
Determining Financial Health
As Cheit pointed out in the original study, 
determining financial health at a college is very 
difficult. It is not as simple as locating the bottom line 
of a balance sheet to find a net dollar profit or loss. 
There are certain qualitative measures that need to be 
accounted for that go beyond merely determining if a 
college has been able to balance its budget. Obviously 
this would be a undeniable sign of financial trouble but 
this study goes beyond this level of analysis to take a 
more qualitative look at financial health. To maintain the 
integrity of the original study, this follow-up study 
follows the same criteria in evaluating the colleges' 
financial condition.
The following indicators used by Cheit were used to 
determine the financial condition of each college. The 
actions typically taken by colleges in financial difficulty 
include:
1. Deficit spending.
2. Reducing the number of faculty either by cutbacks, or by 
a freeze on hiring.
3. Student-faculty ratios increasing due to increasing 
enrollment without corresponding increases of faculty.
4. Cutting academic programs.
5. Reducing the number of administrators or not adding ones
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that are needed.
Colleges headed for financial trouble typically take 
four actions that often follow patterns of decision-making 
that include:
1. Postponing: Cutting back planned program growth. These 
measures include deferring maintenance, postponing 
landscaping, minor capital improvements, etc.
2. General belt tightening measures such as: a)
Maintenance cuts and short term fixes, b) Cutting funds 
for experimental programs, c) Cutting student aid and 
special admissions. Included in this study are reductions 
in the competitiveness of its admissions profile. Although 
not considered by Cheit, this is a factor that has far 
reaching implications and deserves attention when 
considering the overall financial strength of a selective 
college, e) Eliminating selected communications, cultural, 
and student services, f) Freezing hiring of nonacademic 
employees, g) Cutting salaries.
3. Cutting and reallocating within the existing structure, 
including such measures as: moving money between academic
departments by attrition, increasing enrollment where 
students are an asset and marketplace demands are greater. 
For example, popular demand subjects not truly at the heart 
of a traditional liberal arts program and reducing low 
enrollment majors where they are a financial liability.
4. Scrambling for funds. Dramatically increasing tuition,
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fees, and private business measures such as auxiliary 
services and other programs not related to the historic 
mission of the school.
The actions typically taken by colleges in good 
financial condition include:
1. Maintaining or increasing expenditures per student for 
budgeted department instruction and research and the funds 
budgeted for faculty teaching, research and faculty 
development through academic departments.
2. Maintaining or increasing educational and general 
expenditures per student, less sponsored research. These 
are total current fund expenditures.
3. Maintaining or increasing education and general 
expenditures per student. These are total current expense 
budget and excludes funds spent for auxiliary enterprises 
and student aid.
4. Increasing student aid expenditures. These are total 
funds spent per student for student financial aid, and 
excludes loans. When the data was available need-based and 
merit-based assistance are separated. Dramatic increases 
in merit-based aid are considered reduced pricing for 
students and can represent a college's decreasing 
competitiveness in attracting highly qualified students.
For the purposes of this study the conclusions that 
Cheit used to label an institution in financial difficulty, 
not in financial difficulty, or headed for trouble are
important, but just as important are the ten year trends 
that are influencing the campus condition, and income and 
expenditure patterns. It is important to recognize that 
higher education is in a new era and not all the standards 
for determining financial health by Cheit can be used 
today. Higher education overall is not experiencing the 
growth that it did at the time of the original study and 
therefore neither are individual institutions. Making 
these judgments is tricky business, but analyzing data from 
1980 through 1990 can reveal financial trends that are 
either a cause for concern or that would dispel the 
conventional wisdom that the 1980s would be a decade of 
disaster, particularly for the liberal arts college in the 
Midwest. The changing financing patterns for each of these 
institutions can reveal financial trends about income and 
expenditure patterns trends that can broaden our 
understanding of the impact the predicted crisis of the 
1980s has had on the financial condition of these colleges, 
and the role federal and state governments have played 
meeting the needs of this sector.
III. Case Study: Beloit College
Historical Context and Base Point for Analysis
Located in Beloit, Wisconsin, a small industrial city 
on the border of neighboring Illinois, is Beloit College, 
known for its liberal arts educational tradition, and 
distinguished by innovative overtones. Founded in the 
spirit of college building that marked the 19th century, 
the vision of what would become Beloit College was begun by 
a group of clerical and secular participants known as the 
"Friends of Education." Seeking funding for the 
establishment of a frontier college in the mid 1840s, the 
Friends of Education accepted an offer of $7,000 in 
supplies, materials, labor and a small amount of cash from 
the village of Beloit. It is a good example of the 
"booster college" founded by numerous frontier communities 
and the American style in higher education that was part of 
early community building in many small towns (Boorstin,
1965). The founding of a college served to legitimize a 
town and Beloit College was founded by its citizens to 
assume that role. After receiving the necessary funding a 
Board of Trustees was chosen and a charter was adopted that 
was enacted into law on February 2, 1846.
Like most colleges of that era, Beloit patterned its 
curriculum after the classical Yale model (circa 1828).
The college has shown a spirit of curricular innovation and
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experimentation since its founding. In the 1890s the 
college began to emphasize the sciences, including a course 
in evolution, and students were given greater latitude in 
course selection. In the post WWI era home economics and 
journalism were offered, but the curricular emphasis 
remained rooted in the liberal arts.
In the 1960s the college inaugurated its "World 
Outlook" program and introduced the "Beloit Plan," an 
innovative year-round educational program. In 1981 the 
authors of the Insiders Guide to Colleges wrote that "the 
Beloit Plan is the first and only reason to attend Beloit." 
The Beloit Plan truly made the college distinctive and the 
unique academic calendar that was integral to the plan 
provided students with attractive nontraditional 
educational experiences, including coop programs, 
international experiences and seminars. This distinctive 
tradition helped Beloit develop a national student body, 
with a "sizeable group of intellectual bohemians," who 
prided themselves on individualism and unconventional 
attitudes, especially for a college located in the Midwest 
(Insiders Guide to Colleges, 1981).
Many of the elements of this program continue today, 
but due to financial concerns and enrollment problems, 
along with administrative desires to become known by more 
traditional measures, the academic program was returned to 
a more traditional path. The academic schedule of quarters
that provided unique opportunities for study was changed to 
a traditional semester system in the early 1970s. Changing 
their distinctive academic program has had impact on the 
Beloit's student body. The retraction of the Beloit Plan 
has been accompanied by student attitudes that are now more 
traditional and conventional -- like the academic program- 
- although a liberal tradition does continue (The Insiders 
Guide, 1991). Most of the students today are from 
Wisconsin, Chicago, and the East Coast. The college is 
known for its flexible curriculum, small, intimate classes, 
and a solid academic program. Through the early years of 
curriculum modernization and the later years of 
experimentation, to the present, the college adhered to its 
liberal arts tradition and has rejected the demand for 
"practical" education.
Beloit is one of twenty-nine independent colleges and 
universities in Wisconsin. Twenty-one of these 
institutions are members of the Wisconsin Association of 
Independent Colleges and Universities. Of this group, only 
Beloit and three others are classified as Liberal Arts I 
colleges by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of 
Teaching. All of the Liberal Arts I colleges in the state 
are independent and their total enrollments combined were 
4,526 as of 1987-88. This represents 14% of the students 
enrolled in independent colleges and universities in the 
state and 2% of the total enrollment for both public and
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independent institutions.
After sharp enrollment reductions during WWII, the 
college shared in the post-war growth and enrollments 
swelled to more than 1,000. But by 1970 it faced the 
problems of smaller enrollments, changing student 
interests, and an inflationary economy. It was at this 
time that Cheit presented his comprehensive financial study 
that characterized Beloit College as an institution in 
financial difficulty. The reasons for being in financial 
difficulty were attributed to rapidly rising costs, growing 
demand, and a declining rate of income growth.
This cost income squeeze was causing the college to 
cut expenditures and the rate of income growth was 
declining faster than the rate of expenditure growth.
Beloit College was actually deficit spending by $200,000 in 
1971. It had been observed that college faculty "is 12 
positions below what it should be. The number of 
nonacademic employees has been reduced. For 1970-71, 
$100,000 has been cut from the total spent on aid in 1969- 
70. The planned library budget allocation has been 
reduced. A planned American-studies program was postponed 
as well as an undergraduate tutorial program. Performing 
arts and cultural affairs have been reduced {Cheit p. 98, 
1971) . "
But two years later Cheit reported an improved 
situation for the college. The "fragile stability"
described by Cheit, was based on "an upturn in student 
enrollment and retention levels, plus increased current and 
capital gift program, and improved planning and cost 
control procedures have enabled the college to 
substantially improve its financial situation during the 
last two years and to protect it for the short term future. 
Balanced budgets during the past two years have been 
accomplished without academic program cutbacks, and no 
further cuts in faculty or staff are anticipated (p.21)." 
Two years later, programs that were previously threatened 
were either being retained or expanded and new academic 
innovations were begun in 1972 as part of a major 
curriculum refinement.
What was once a widening gap between income and 
expenditures was coming under control but the college still 
had cause for concern and according to Cheit long-term 
stability and the competitive position was dependent on 
four crucial factors. The future was linked to "1) success 
of the current capital-fund campaign, 2) continued 
improvement in the current gift program, 3) continued 
attractiveness of the innovative Beloit program to 
students, and 4) a major public policy shift in educational 
opportunity by subsidizing the student so he can be free to 
choose his college on educational rather financial grounds 
in place of operating government institutions at low 
tuition (p.21)."
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One thing is apparent for the future of Beloit in 
1973. Its financial stability was increasingly subject to 
external factors of government funding, demographic trends, 
and philanthropy that would provide the financial resources 
to maintain the quality of its academic program. These 
were all the areas that by 1978 were predicted to have 
significant impact on liberal arts colleges in the Midwest. 
Beloit's ability to expand its fund-raising capacity, 
attract students, and draw public funding in the 1980s were 
the catalysts that determined the financial condition by 
the early 1990s.
Beloit entered the 1980s coming off some serious 
problems encountered in the 1970s. The 1950s and 1960s had 
brought on huge growth that they were not able to maintain. 
There were declines in enrollment, and weak endowment 
resources caused a serious shortfall in income. This led 
the institution to take drastic measures. They cut their 
staff almost in half and by 1979 several academic programs 
were cut {Neuendorf, 1992). One administrative decision 
that had direct impact on the college's income generation 
was a tuition program begun in the early 1970s that linked 
tuition to a student's ability to pay. The amount 
determined at time of entrance guaranteed fixed tuition for 
the student's remaining years. While the program was an 
attractive feature and helped Beloit with some of their 
enrollment problems, in the end this program had serious
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financial consequences for the college. The discounting 
negatively affected the college's ability to generate 
income and was a long-term drain on financial resources. 
Consequently, the college never built up a large financial 
aid pool (Neuendorf,1992).
Many of the problems that were predicted to cause 
serious problems in the 1980s had already been experienced 
by Beloit in the late 1970s. The college had developed a 
strategic plan for the coming decade and was beginning to 
replenish its faculty and hire new academic staff. In 
1992, Vice President for Administration and Treasurer Duane 
Neuendorf described Beloit's financial as "not in financial 
trouble." He attributed the present situation to their 
ability to replenish the institution's financial resources 
through large endowment increases and annual fund revenues 
that continued to grow. An analysis of Beloit's current 
fund revenues will show the sources where the college was 
able to raise its needed revenues.
Generating the Needed Revenues
In 1980 the college had an endowment of $8 million 
that grew to $40 million by 1990. This has been an 
increasingly important source of revenue for Beloit (table 
la). Endowment income grew steadily over the decade, 
representing a 210% increase, which produced an 
increasingly significant percentage of total current fund 
revenues. This can be attributed to not only the rise in
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total endowment dollars but also the yield on investments 
due to an expanding stock market. The percentage of the 
total revenues in constant 1979 dollars went from 4.4% in
1979 to 7.2% in 1989, with some years contributing an even 
greater share of revenues to the college.
Another ten-year capital campaign began in 1987 with 
the goal of raising $100 million. The first half of the 
campaign, which ended in 1992, raised $35 million. Even 
though they fell short of the $50 million goal of the first 
half of the campaign college officials are optimistic about 
reaching their $50 million goal for the second half of the 
campaign, which is when it will begin its public campaign. 
Based on the experience of the past decade this will be an 
important goal to reach. Endowment income was an important 
contributor to Beloit's increasing budget base and annual 
income. Even though this source has contributed a greater 
share of the college's income it has not reduced their 
dependence on tuition and fees.
While the endowment and endowment income steadily 
increased, the income derived from private gifts, grants 
and contracts was somewhat erratic, but did show overall 
growth for the decade {table 2a). There was a large 
increase from this source between 1979 and 1980, but since
1980 this source of revenue has decreased as a percentage 
of total revenues. Almost every year that there was an 
increase, it was followed by a drop in total dollars
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received. Even with a 51% increase from 1980 to 1989 this 
source of revenue has not kept pace with the increase in 
total current fund revenues of the decade, and continually 
declined as a percentage of total revenues. This is not a 
positive trend considering that this is an area that 
college officials are focusing on as source of new flexible 
money for the future.
Beloit has been and remains an institution that is 
heavily dependent on tuition and therefore enrollment 
stability is essential to their financial strength. The 
college had unplanned declines in the 1970s that bottomed 
out in 1984 (table 3a). From 1985 until 1988 there were 
continual enrollment increases that peaked in 1988 with an 
all time high of 1,203 FTE students. Beloit has very few 
students enrolled part-time so this number overwhelmingly 
represents full-time degree seeking undergraduate students. 
The college has offered a graduate program in education for 
many years, but the program only enrolls approximately 15 
students and does not have any significant impact on 
enrollment or income. They do not plan to expand this 
program and it will remain peripheral to the college,s 
primary academic mission of serving traditional 
undergraduate students (Neuendorf, 1992).
1,100 to 1,200 students is viewed as the optimal 
enrollment for the institution. Beloit has the ability to 
house 1,000 students on the campus and because of their
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mission to be primarily a residential college they would 
not want to see the institution grow beyond their capacity 
to provide housing. At 1,200 students the college begins 
to have a problem accommodating its students, both with 
housing and other space limitations and their desire to 
maintain a low student-faculty ratio and small class size 
(Neuendorf, 1992).
The 1980s was a period of stable enrollments, 
especially over the last five years of the decade. The 
college was able overcome the demographic declines in the 
second half of the 1980s. Although there were slight 
decreases of FTE's in 1989 and 1990, the change was very 
slight, making enrollment increases and then stability the 
trends that marked the second half of the decade.
This was accomplished in part by slight reductions of 
the quality of the student body based on the class rank of 
enrolling freshmen. In 1982 the college reported that 31% 
of enrolling freshmen were from the top tenth of their 
graduating class and by 1992 this had decreased to 27%. 
However, in the same time period they were able reduce 
their overall acceptance rate from 91% to 85%. This was 
due in part to improved freshmen retention and graduation 
rates that allowed the college to enroll smaller freshman 
classes and still maintain desired enrollments. The 
freshmen retention rate was 88% in 1982 and improved to 93% 
by 1992, while graduation rates increased from 58% to 63%.
Improved retention rates were accomplished through a 
variety of measures. In 1986 Beloit began a freshman 
orientation program referred to as "freshman college." All 
freshmen are brought to the campus ten days before the 
upperclassmen arrive for a ten day orientation to prepare 
the students for their initial experiences. The program is 
run by the student life staff and it appears to have had a 
direct impact on student retention. Before the program was 
begun Beloit had a 10% to 15% attrition rate after the 
first year. Since the inception of the program, the 
attrition rate has fallen 5% to 8%. Freshmen were also 
offered common academic seminars by the Dean's Office to 
provide a common academic experience for the incoming 
students. Improved retention has directly impacted the 
overall enrollment of Beloit. The inception of these 
programs directly corresponds to the years when the college 
began to have more stable enrollments. Now the college 
also offers a sophomore program that focuses on student 
advising and improved curriculum planning to help further 
stem attrition.
As mentioned, Beloit is very dependent on its tuition 
and fee revenues and this dependence increased from 1979- 
1980. The percentage of total current fund revenues from 
tuition in 1979 was 56%, which dropped to around 50% from 
1980 to 1982, and steadily increased to 57% in 1989. To 
generate the revenues necessary to maintain a balanced
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budget and hold steady the percentage of income received 
from tuition, the college had to dramatically increase its 
tuition rates over the decade. Tuition revenues during 
this period increased 92%, in constant 1979 dollars, with 
the largest increases occurring between 1985 and 1989, when 
there was a 40% increase (table 4a). Even as the number of 
tuition paying students increased, the college has 
continued to increase its tuition at a consistently high 
rate. College officials are concerned about the 
dependence on tuition and this trend is not a positive 
sign.
Cheit maintained back in the early 1970s that 
independent colleges were beginning to hit the threshold in 
relation to their price. Apparently, Beloit did not hit 
this threshold in the high economic growth years of the 
1980s. But college officials do not anticipate the 
economic growth in the 1990s to be as great as the 1980s 
and are beginning to have concerns about resistance to the 
high price of a private college, especially among middle 
income families that are increasingly choosing the low-cost 
public institutions (Neuendorf, 1992). This is becoming 
apparent as the average family income at flagship 
universities has become higher at comparable colleges 
(Education Commission of the States, 1990). It is believed 
that the college has finally hit a tuition threshold and 
must maintain its relative costs to attract middle income
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students. For each dollar tuition is raised the college
only gets a 20%-30% return because of the amount that must
be allotted to financial aid (Neuendorf, 1992). The 
question that remains is, where will the revenues come from 
if not from tuition. Beloit's past experience tells us 
that this is the source it has had to depend on for income 
growth.
State and local government grants and contracts have 
had relatively little impact on Beloit's current fund 
revenues (table 5a). In 1979 this revenue source accounted 
for only 1% of its revenues. As an income source it has 
fluctuated throughout the decade and even when the college 
was receiving its largest amount in real terms in 1989, as 
a revenue source it only accounted for 1.2% of total 
revenues. While grants and contracts only represented a
small portion of income, it should be noted that as a
nonprofit organization the institution is not taxed and 
therefore untaxed revenues and waived public service 
charges from the local and state sources represented a 
significant income source that is not apparent when 
reviewing HEGIS/IPEDS income data.
College officials did not report any strained 
relations with the local community to tax the college for 
the services that they provide to them. If this were to 
change in the coming years, the college would lose a 
significant income source that would become another
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expenditure source. Maintaining good relations is one area 
that can be impacted by the service component of Beloit's 
mission. The benefits the community recognizes from the 
college in the form of economic impact as well as services 
provided can influence the community's perception of the 
institution and their willingness to forego the revenue 
drain that the college has on the community's tax base.
The importance of total institutional management is 
reflected in the college's dependence on auxiliary 
enterprises as a revenue source (table 6a). The amount of 
income derived from auxiliary enterprises increased 92% 
from 1979 to 1989, with the largest increases coming after 
1982. These enterprises are managed as essentially self- 
supporting activities that exist to provide services to 
students, faculty, and staff. Because their fees are 
directly related (although not necessarily equal) to the 
cost of the service, there is a relationship between the 
price of attendance and the cost of auxiliary services. 
Because these sources of revenues are directly related to 
the number of students enrolled it places even more 
importance on enrollment stability. Not only do students 
bring in tuition dollars but they also purchase services 
such as food, housing, and books that provide an important 
source of income for the college. At Beloit it is a 
significant source of income, and over the previous decade 
they have had continually increasing income from providing
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such services.
The college has spent approximately $12-15 million in 
renovations of residence halls and built a new sports 
center to make the school more attractive to potential 
students, but they have had to continually increase the 
fees for these and other services in order to provide them. 
This translates into a higher price for the students. 
Auxiliary enterprises have provided a steady income source, 
accounting for 17% to 23% of the revenues annually. To 
maintain this percentage there has been a dramatic increase 
in total revenues received from this source.
Federal government grants and contracts are typically 
not a significant income source for liberal arts colleges. 
Beloit's mission of teaching and their lack of reliance on 
government grants and contracts could be seen as positive 
considering the wide fluctuations and cutbacks of federal 
government spending over the 1980s. At Beloit over the 
1980s this source of income has fluctuated in real terms, 
not showing the continual increase as other sources that 
are more under the college's direct control (table 7a).
Even though the growth has not been consistent from year to 
year, there was a 41% increase during the period studied.
As a percentage of total income it has held fairly 
constant, only fluctuating a one percentage point at the 
most.
Beloit College did not report generating any revenue
from independent operations or the sale of services or 
educational activities, but they do bring additional 
revenues from other sources. Like most of the other 
revenue sources there has been an increase in the income 
from these particular sources. Over the past decade there 
has been a 58% increase from these sources. As an income 
source they are not as dependable from year to year and 
there is significant fluctuations. They are not as 
significant either, typically only generating 2.5% to 3% of 
total income.
Overall, Beloit College has been able to increase its 
income over the previous decade by 88% (table 3a). Based 
on the review of income sources over that time period it is 
evident that the increase in income has come primarily from 
its own initiatives. While all income sources showed 
increases, the vast majority of income has and continues to 
be derived from areas related to enrollment. Tuition and 
fees and income received from auxiliary enterprises, which 
is directly related to fees provided primarily by students, 
comprised 73% of income sources by 1989 and the percentage 
of total income from these sources stayed constant over the 
decade. The one area where there was significant increase 
was endowment income and this is an area that college 
officials will look to more and more as a revenue source 
for the future.
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Institutional Expenditure Patterns
The continuous income increase was used to fuel 
increasing expenditures at the college. Education and 
general expenditures (E&G), excluding Pell Grants and 
nonmanditory transfers, rose 79% over the 1980s. This 
represents a 49% expenditure increase per student between 
1979 and 1989 {table 9a). However, as enrollment grew in 
the later part of the decade the college decreased its 
expenditures per student for four straight years until 1989 
when spending per student reached its highest level. It is 
not clear whether this can attributed to economies of scale 
that make for a more efficient organization. But spending 
per student did increase in 1989 when the college had a 
slight enrollment drop, which would suggest that this is 
not the explanation. With budgets set, an unexpected lower 
enrollment would naturally leave more money to be spent per 
student. The breakdown of these expenditures by category 
and on a per student basis reveals the institutional 
priorities and new financial demands on the college.
Expenditures for instructional purposes directly 
related to the primary teaching mission of a teaching 
college showed continual increases in dollar amounts over 
the ten year period (table 10a). However, as enrollment 
rose throughout the latter part of the decade instructional 
spending per student increases were minimal in some years 
and there were actual deceases in others. If we look at
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two years when enrollments were roughly equal, 1982 and 
1986, it is apparent that the college's increasing income 
base was transferred into increased spending per student. 
Overall, instructional spending increased 56% over the 
1980s and spending per student increased 30%.
1989 was a unique year that did not follow the 
previously consistent four year pattern. After four years 
of increasing enrollment's the college had a slight drop in 
enrollment and since budgets were probably based on having 
a larger student body, the drop in size caused spending per 
student to rise. If 1989 is factored out, the gains are 
substantial but not as impressive, with instructional 
spending per student increasing 13% and total spending 
increasing 38%. Overall, instructional spending increases 
did keep pace with the increasing income base of the 
college over the ten year period. The college consistently 
spent around 32% of its operating budget on areas directly 
related to instruction.
Because the largest expenditure for instruction is 
faculty salaries, increases have had a big affect on this 
area. As enrollment increased there were a few faculty 
added to maintain the 12:1 student-faculty ratio and 
improve program offerings, but the enrollment increases 
served to bring the ratio back up to compensate for the 
imbalance that occurred due to enrollment declines in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. The college's budget has also
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been hit very hard by the rising fringe benefits costs of 
the 1980s that have required them to spend more in the area 
of instruction (Neuendorf,1992). This had a significant 
impact because the college gained no added faculty or staff 
services for these expenses.
Program growth over the period was described as 
"modest." When the college was going through the 
enrollment declines of the late 1970s and early 1980s 
administrators began to question their program offerings.
It was thought that the curriculum might not have been 
meeting the interests of the new students entering higher 
education. But a move to add business and communications 
programs was rejected and Beloit held to its traditional 
liberal arts program. The economics major was revamped to 
make it more appealing to students interested in this area, 
and even though there still were no business or accounting 
majors, the courses added represented a slight but 
insignificant appeasement to consumer demands. Overall, 
Beloit held fast to its historic mission even in the face 
of adversity and plans to hold its position as a liberal 
arts college.
There was some experimentation with the curriculum and 
a few more courses were added. Debate and drama programs 
were added because they were areas that could help them 
attract students and the music faculty was increased for 
similar reasons. The overall growth was modest because new
programs and courses were added primarily through trade­
offs by replacing eliminated courses with new ones. 
Resources were reallocated to reshape the curriculum 
through an evolutionary modification. Increasing the 
number of interdisciplinary programs was and is a very 
attractive option because it allows the college to use 
existing faculty from traditional departments to make the 
academic program more attractive and responsive to student 
demands and needs without significant faculty hiring.
The college had very significant increases in 
expenditures for academic support services that are 
integral to the institution's primary mission of 
instruction, research, and service. Expenditures for these 
services increased 128% over the 1980s (table 11a).
Academic computing support was enhanced throughout the 
decade. The faculty was computerized and computer 
equipment was purchased for student labs. Just as the 
information explosion has resulted in greater library 
costs, the technological revolution required the college to 
keep up with technological advances that provide a service 
for both faculty and students (Neuendorf, 1992). In 
addition to total expenditure increases, expenditures per 
student increased dramatically over the decade by 90%. The 
largest increases came from non-library academic support. 
This item represented a 162% expenditure increase over the 
decade with a 96% increase in library expenditures (table
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12a and 13a),.
As high school graduation rates declined, colleges 
such as Beloit faced a buyers market. Students not only 
had more needs but more demands and this required Beloit to 
place greater emphasis on the services that it can offer 
its students. Over the decade this has translated into a 
128% increase in expenditures for student services (table 
14a). This dramatic increase was not just due to 
enrollment increases. When this is factored out by looking 
at these expenditures from a dollar-per-student basis the 
increases are also very substantial, with per student 
spending increasing 90% over the decade.
According to college officials, most of the extra 
money available went to admissions because it is the one 
student service area that generates revenue. This was the 
only area where staff was increased. The college faced a 
competitive market and costs for travel, publications, and 
mass marketing required the college to place greater 
emphasis and spending on admissions and recruitment. But 
these expenses were not exclusively responsible for the 
increased expenditures in student services. Career 
planning and placement, psychological services, cultural 
and social programs, health services and all the areas 
related to the students' emotional and physical well being 
all required increased emphasis and funding. To keep a 
college attractive to students in a buyers market, these
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offerings are no longer luxuries that a college can live 
without. Students now expect these elements in the 
colleges they attend and this has translated into a 
dramatic expenditure increase for Beloit.
Trying to stay relatively price competitive has been 
costly for colleges such as Beloit. One of its major 
competitors are the public institutions in the state that 
offer educational services at an extremely reduced rate.
In addition, independent institutions have begun bidding 
wars for the top students and merit-based assistance has 
become a costly, but probably essential, price reduction 
method for the college. Beloit provides a good example of 
the solid but unspectacular college that by the early 
1980s, given the demographic projections, had to do 
something to compete head-to-head with the top private 
colleges and universities for the best students. These are 
the students faculty want to teach and they enhance the 
overall academic reputation of the institution. The amount 
of institutional grant money provided over the ten year 
period has steadily increased in total dollar amounts, 
dollar-per-student expenditures, as well as the percentage 
of total expenditures at Beloit (table 15a).
From 1979 to 1989 total dollars spent on scholarships 
and fellowships increased by 119%, dollar-per-student 
expenditures increased by 82%, and by 1989 represented 21% 
of all the college's expenditures. Financial aid has
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become one of the major components of the budget -- next to 
salaries it is the second highest expenditure item. 
Approximately 10% of scholarship and grant aid comes from 
gifts and endowment sources and 90% comes from general 
funds (Neuendorf, 1992) . These increases are not 
surprising because of the tuition increases over the 
decade. As tuition goes up so must the financial budget, 
and as was noted earlier, the college is reaching a 
threshold of tuition increases because 70% to 80% of the 
additional revenues gained from each dollar tuition is 
increased goes directly into the financial aid budget 
(Neuendorf, 1992).
These changes are based on Pell Grants being factored 
out of aid expenditures. In general, Pell has been a 
revenue source that has fluctuated in total dollar amounts 
and as a percentage of the total scholarship and grant 
money provided by the college (table 16a). In 1984-85
11.7% of Pell Grant Expenditures went to independent non­
profit colleges and universities in the state of Wisconsin 
(Wilensky, 1988). Yet, as already noted, 14% of the 
students in the state are enrolled at independent 
institutions, suggesting that a disproportionate share of 
federal money is going to already heavily-subsidized public 
institutions.
Certainly Pell is a good source of revenue for the 
college but the increased income generated from Pell has
not kept up with institutional grant money increases and 
was a fairly stagnant source of income. This provides some 
evidence that the decline in federal spending has had 
financial impact on liberal arts colleges. With more of 
the money going to nontraditional students since 1980, less 
has filtered down to this sector of the higher education 
system. In Beloit's case it does not appear that Pell 
could be linked to tuition increases nor the increases in 
institutional spending for instruction, as has been the 
claim of many of higher education's critics. Spending has 
increased in these areas despite declining revenues from 
Pell.
Beloit has both need-based and merit-based financial 
aid programs. While these two components of the financial 
aid budget are not factored out in HEGIS/IPEDS data, the 
merit-based programs warrant some discussion. In addition 
to a need-based program Beloit has three merit-based 
scholarship programs. The largest of the programs is the 
Presidential Scholarship program. Until recently this was 
a $2500 award, but Beloit is caught in a bidding war trying 
to attract top students, and the amount has been increased 
to $5,000 to maintain its competitiveness with other 
colleges. This is a trend that concerns college officials 
because they fear it will begin to hurt independent higher 
education in the future. Other merit awards include 
American Field Service scholarships of $1,000-$2,000 per
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year and six Collie scholarships of $3,000 per year awarded 
to state residents on a competitive basis. There are also 
numerous endowed scholarships for returning students 
awarded on a competitive basis.
Wisconsin is categorized as a state that takes a 
moderate state role regarding its policies toward 
independent college and universities (Zumeta, 1988}.
Zumeta describes a moderate state role as states that 
deliberately use state policy to improve the competitive 
position of independent institutions. In Zumeta's typology 
this includes strong recognition in planning but generally 
not in setting public missions and program review/approval. 
The Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin system 
is responsible for recognition of private higher education 
in state planning but has no statutory planning authority. 
The only direct grant to private higher education is for 
the Medical Education Contract, designed to increase dental 
education opportunities in the state, consequently colleges 
like Beloit receive no direct grants or contracts from the 
state.
Wisconsin uses the Wisconsin Tuition Grant Program to 
provide "reasonable" choice for students through tuition 
equalization and there is some attention to tuition policy.
This is the primary source of state financial assistance 
to students who chose to attend an independent college or 
university. The grant is need-based and available to
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Wisconsin residents attending independent, non-profit 
postsecondary institutions at least half-time. The minimum 
award is $250 and the maximum is $2,172. This maximum 
need-based award is $1,754 less than the same student would 
receive via the state's $3,926 per capita subsidy to public 
institutions regardless of need. This gap has continually 
increased throughout the 1980s due to limited increase in 
appropriations for the Tuition Grant program (Wisconsin 
Association of Independent Colleges and Universities,
1991).
College officials report that money from the tuition 
grant program has not increased to make up for tuition 
increases. They also point out that they seek and serve a 
national student body and only about twenty percent of 
their students are state residents. The majority of 
Beloit's students come from Illinois and there are 44 
states represented in the student body. In this regard 
Beloit is a victim of its own success. The ability and 
desire to serve a national student body limits their 
ability to attract state resources through the tuition 
grant program. Vice President Neuendorf maintains this is 
a direct result of the college's historic past. If the 
college had been founded twenty-five miles to the south, in 
Illinois, state student financial aid could have a much 
more significant impact on the college.
The more managed organization of today requires
further administration and this has led to increasing 
institutional support expenditures. Expenditures for 
general administrative services, planning, legal and fiscal 
operations and public relations/development have increased 
75% in total dollars and 45% on a dollar-per-student basis 
during the previous decade {table 17a). Like many of the 
other expenditure categories, there has been rising costs 
associated with general administration but it is not taking 
any more dollars on a percentage basis. Positions in 
development have been added and strategic planning groups 
were organized to approach the future problems for the 
institution. College officials also point to 
accountability requirements leading to rising costs in this 
area of the budget.
Throughout the 1980s Beloit was concerned with its 
physical plant. To attract students they needed to pay 
attention to the quality of the residence halls and so they 
have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars renovating 
residence halls and upgrading facilities. This has led to 
an increase of 68% in the expenditures for operation and 
maintenance of the physical plant (table 18a). While this 
increase does not represent as high of an increase an many 
other areas, it is still substantial. However, the 
increases have not come at the expense of areas more 
directly related to the educational program.
Unfortunately, maintaining the level of expenditures
targeted for operation and maintenance of the physical 
plant has only been accomplished through deferred 
maintenance. Beloit does not have the deferred maintenance 
problem of some historic colleges and universities, but 
still they have not been able to meet all of their needs 
while maintaining the maintenance expenditures as a 
percentage of the budget. Maintenance costs can be 
deferred but they do not disappear and they are more 
expensive when put off to the future.
The Financial Condition
When analyzing expenditure changes and patterns at 
Beloit it becomes clear that the institution has not been 
able to hold down its expenditures. Fortunately they have 
been successful in producing the needed revenues to 
compensate for their inability to hold down costs. A 
couple of trends are evident. Administrative cost are 
going up, especially in areas that relate to making the 
campus and academic programs more attractive to students. 
But it also appears that it is simply becoming more costly 
to run the organization. The only administrative positions 
added were in revenue-generating departments such as 
admissions and development. Expenditures grew faster in 
areas of academic support and student services than in 
resources directly related to instruction. However, the 
college has been able to improve the academic program, and 
add needed faculty and courses. During the 1980s they were
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able to make up for the faculty shortage reported by Cheit 
in 1973 and maintain their goal of having a 12:1 student- 
faculty ratio.
Based on the standards set by Cheit to judge the 
financial condition of the college, Beloit would have to 
fall somewhere between headed for trouble and not in 
financial trouble. The college is probably characterized 
better by the "fragile stability" that Cheit described in 
1973. Beloit has been able to maintain some growth 
throughout the decade and balance its budget every year.
It has been able to channel its increased resources into 
academic and nonacademic areas to improve both the academic 
program and services provided to its students. The fact 
that more of the income growth has been targeted for 
services reflects students' needs and demands in a 
competitive market. Several facilities have been renovated 
and new facilities such as the sports complex and new 
playing fields were added. Salaries have also been 
increased to keep pace with inflation and maintain 
competitiveness with peer institutions in the Associated 
Colleges of the Midwest.
Probably the most important observation is that they 
were able to adhere to their traditional liberal arts 
academic program and mission of being a residential college 
of traditional age students. The college's ability to 
substantially increase its endowment and endowment income
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as well as their success in the current capital campaign is 
positive sign for the future. This is not to suggest that 
maintaining these goals has been an easy administrative 
task for Beloit and there some areas that continue to be a 
cause for concern. In looking at its recent past it 
appears that the college has not been able alter many of 
the trends that threaten its financial condition.
The college has been affected by reduced state and 
federal aid sources and is experiencing rising student aid 
expenditures. Rapidly rising tuition has fueled the modest 
growth the college has experienced but Beloit is beginning 
to see the threshold of those increases. As already noted 
tuition increases are now primarily channeled into the 
student aid budget with little realization of increased 
revenue. Lastly, administrative costs continued to 
increase throughout the decade and increasingly took more 
of the resources that could have been targeted for academic 
program growth.
Beloit exhibited several of the signs of an 
institution headed for trouble. For example,there has been 
little "new" money available for program growth. While 
there have been some new courses added and faculty hired to 
enhance the academic program, most of this was accomplished 
by reallocating resources. In general, programs are 
competing for the resources available and program 
development has kept pace with faculty aspirations. All
areas have experienced the general belt tightening that 
characterizes schools that are headed for financial 
trouble. The financial situation of Beloit has affected 
its administrative decision-making. Administrators have 
had to prioritize their goals but these established 
priorities were subject to change when targeted money 
became available. But Beloit has not had to make painful 
cuts or dig into endowment to meet its obligations and 
goals. When asked to rank their unmet needs administrators 
site faculty salaries, program development, capital 
acquisitions (primarily computers), and renovations of the 
physical plant.
"Fragile stability" is used as the term to describe 
Beloit because the college has displayed characteristics of 
both an institution headed for financial trouble and one 
that has a stable financial condition. Beloit's financial 
condition throughout the 1990s will depend on several 
factors and administrators look to several areas for 
stability. Some of these factors are within the 
institution's control and others will depend on external 
sources over which the college has limited control or 
influence.
Beloit's ability to maintain the modest growth of the 
1980s will be very dependent on their ability meet fund­
raising goals. They look to this area not only to provide 
general revenues for the annual budget but also to enhance
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the faculty and the academic program. They seek to do this 
by establishing endowed chairs through new grants and 
general fund-raising. In the past decade they were able to 
increase their endowment and endowment income but they were 
not successful in reducing their tuition dependence.
Reducing tuition dependence is one of the most 
important long-term goals for the college. State and 
federal funding that was stable in the 1980s will need to 
be increased to help institutions such as Beloit reduce 
their financial aid expenditures and help them become more 
price competitive with public institutions. They will 
continue to lobby through the Wisconsin Association of 
Independent Colleges and Universities (WAICU) to get their 
message out, but they are at a competitive disadvantage. 
WAICU has only one lobbyist compared to 76 for the 
University of Wisconsin System. Administrators are 
concerned about the cost of the merit-based assistance that 
they have felt compelled to increase to compete for top 
students. Overall tuition discounting is a big concern for 
the future.
Ultimately enrollment stability will remain Beloit's 
key to financial stability in the future, just as it has in 
the past. While demographic trends show some positive 
signs the expanding pool of high school graduates will not 
be from the same traditional base of students and 
administrators are concerned about the impact this will
have on the college. An increasing number of high school 
students will come primarily from minority and lower income 
groups. The demographic changes that could influence the 
composition of student body will put even more pressure on 
financial aid expenditures and special programs designed 
for these groups of students. Beloit's ability to adapt 
and change will be essential to their enrollment stability 
and financial health.
IV. Case Study: Knox College
Historical Context and Base Point for Analysis
Knox College in Illinois was founded in 1837 by a 
group of educational enthusiasts who brought the ideals of 
the traditional classical curriculum to the edge of the 
prairie. It is one of the many colleges founded by 
Easterners in the era of college building who devoted their 
lives to education and preaching in what was known then as 
the "Far West" (Boorstin, 1965). While the curriculum at 
Knox has undergone many changes and has been modernized 
throughout its 150 year history, the college prides itself 
on maintaining a strong liberal arts tradition.
The college distinguishes itself on its past tradition 
of being a center for open criticism and social justice. 
Knox's distinctive traditions include being one of the 
first coeducational colleges in America and a leader in 
opening its doors to black students. It was also the 
first college in Illinois to be awarded a chapter of Phi 
Beta Kappa.
Knox is considered one of the top colleges in the 
Midwest for its strong competitive academic programs. This 
image is based in some respects on an outstanding record of 
graduate school placement and fellowships. This combined 
with pre-professional programs such as 3-3 medical program 
arranged with Rush Medical School and early admission to
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the University of Chicago's Graduate School of Business, is 
part of Knox's has evolution in many ways into what Jencks 
and Riesman (1968) described as the "university college." 
However, Knox falls short of being a "university college" 
in the true sense of the definition, largely because it 
does not compete nationally for its students and instead 
remains primarily a regional college,
Knox has the image of offering a challenging academic 
program and a high level of academic interest among 
students. The interaction among students and faculty is 
described as close and relaxed, with an honor code that 
goes as far as having no proctors at exams (The Insiders 
Guide, 1991). Its regional student body hails primarily 
from upper-middle-class suburbs in Chicago and St. Louis, 
although students from throughout Illinois are also well 
represented.
The college is located in the small town of Galesburg, 
a farming center and the county seat. It is one of 103 
independent colleges and universities and one of the nine 
Liberal Arts I colleges in the state of Illinois. Illinois 
has a large independent sector that enrolls 27% of the 
state's 458,828 college students. The 9,843 students 
enrolled at the nine Liberal Arts I colleges comprise 7.8% 
of students enrolled at independent colleges and 
universities and comprise only 2.1% of the total enrollment 
in the state.
Because it has such a high number of students enrolled 
in independent higher education, Illinois is recognized for 
playing a major state role regarding policies that affect 
independent higher education (Zumeta, 1988). The Illinois 
Board of Higher Education has statutory planning authority 
for independent higher education and independent 
institutions are considered integral to the state higher 
education system. The state provides comprehensive student 
and institutional aid to independent non-profit colleges 
and universities.
Like many colleges and universities coming out of 
higher education's "Golden Years" of the 1950s and 1960s, 
Knox looked to the future optimistically and began an 
aggressive building program and budget expansion that the 
college was unable to sustain (Strassburger, 1992). It was 
at this time that Cheit conducted his first study on the 
financial condition of colleges and universities throughout 
the country that included an analysis of Knox College.
Knox was characterized as one of the institutions "headed 
for financial trouble" in 1971. Writing in the early 1970s 
Cheit made the following observations: "reserves are down 
from $1,200,000 to $250,000. The growing quality of the 
University of Illinois is being felt. College officials 
believe that, even though there have been no major 
disturbances on campus, Knox has nevertheless been hurt in 
the eyes of private donors. They fear that parents of this
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generation may become still more unwilling to underwrite an 
expensive education. Insurance and security costs have 
increased, but the most important additional cost is the 
staff time and energy spent attending to or anticipating 
campus disturbance problems. The knowledge explosion has 
created problems in financing computers and the library. 
Since inflation exceeded predictions, Knox is spending more 
on student aid than it had expected (Cheit, 1971 p. 78) . ■'
This was what Cheit observed and the factors affecting 
the campus condition caused concern about the future path 
of Knox. Campus disturbances had some immediate financial 
impact but the consequences would not be long lived. As we 
will see, philanthropic support increased significantly 
after Cheit's study and enrollment problems were almost 
certainly due to factors other than a tarnished image from 
the turbulent 1960s. The problems that Cheit identified in 
his follow-up student were rooted in a variety of other 
areas.
Two years later Cheit observed that Knox's financial 
situation was better than in 1971. At the time of his 
follow-up study in 1973, Cheit observed: "the college has 
cut costs and its financial situation is pretty much under 
control. Reserves have been depleted; cost cutting has 
been severe. Costs are under control" (p. 31). In many 
ways it appears that Cheit correctly estimated the 
financial problems of the college and painted a negative of
a picture for Knox, if the trends he was observing 
continued. In fact, Knox's building and budget expansion 
at the end of the growth years was followed by a big 
downturn in admissions. In 1972-73 the college went from 
1,500 to 1,300 students in one year, which began several 
years with financial problems. In 1974 the colleges long­
time president died and left to his successor a $10 million 
debt, $10 million in capital improvements, and a $10 
million endowment.
College officials maintain that the enrollment 
declines of the early 1970s to the early 1980s and the 
corresponding financial problems prepared them for the 
challenges of the 1980s (Strassburger, 1992). The 
experience of enrollment declines in the 1970s and 
financial problems of that era produced a lean organization 
long before the demographic declines of the 1980s. Coming 
out of the most recent decade, college officials described 
the financial condition of the college as "good but not 
great." By the early 1990s the college had accumulated a 
$10-12 million debt and was deficit spending (Strassburger, 
1992). The following section will look at Knox's recent 
past and analyze the income expenditure patterns that the 
college has experienced over the 1980s. These trends 
reveal the pressures caused by external demographic and 
policy factors that are influencing the college's current 
financial situation.
Like almost all colleges that have teaching as their 
primary mission, Knox's financial condition is heavily, 
although not exclusively, tied to enrollment and the income 
derived from its students. The college had two distinctive 
trends over the 1980s. From 1979 to 1984 Knox experienced 
a gradual but continual enrollment decline that left its 
enrollment 9.8% below the level at the beginning of the 
decade (table la). Knox was vulnerable to the demographic 
trends of the period given its admissions position. Even 
though it is categorized as a very selective college the 
fact remains that it accepts 80% of its applicants which 
leaves little room or dip in applications. While this is 
an improvement from 1982 when 85% of the applicants were 
accepted, the students entering who graduated in the top 
tenth of their high school graduating class decreased from 
3 9% to 36%. The college responded by placing greater 
emphasis on student recruitment and their admissions 
office.
Knox attempted to increase student retention by 
releasing faculty from teaching time to become more 
involved with students an extracurricular basis. Faculty 
members were expected to use their extra time to develop 
informal discussion groups and informal social gatherings. 
But the faculty did not view this as a productive use of 
time and there was no statistically significant results 
shown for their efforts. Freshmen retention rates stayed
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stable over the period at around 85%, which is comparable 
to most peer institutions.
From 1984 until the end of the decade the college was 
able to improve their enrollment situation with continual 
increases that brought enrollments above the 1979 level 
(table lb). Even though this was an improving situation, 
the college was still below what is considered its optimal 
enrollment. College officials cite 1,150 as the optimal 
size for the college. Even with its small but steady 
increases the college was still more than 100 FTE students 
below its goal by the end of the decade. Did this produce 
a "lean organization" or one that had difficulty generating 
the income necessary to meet its goals?
Generating the Needed Revenues
Knox's income growth over the decade was slow and at 
the beginning of the decade it had decreasing revenues for 
three years (table 2b). There is a close but not exclusive 
relationship between enrollment levels and changes in total 
current fund revenues. The college's declining enrollment 
was one the factors negatively affecting its current fund 
revenues. This explains an increased emphasis on the 
college's admissions office and recruitment efforts. It 
was not until Knox's enrollment began to rebound that its 
revenue base began to increase. From 1982 until the end 
the end of the decade the college had very slow but steady 
income growth that averaged 1.7% over the period. Overall,
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total current fund revenues increased by a 19%. The 
following review of all income sources by category reveals 
where Knox turned to produce the small revenue increases.
Knox is a college that is heavily dependent on tuition 
and fees as a revenue source. Tuition and fees increased 
by 38% in constant dollars over the decade and Knox became 
increasingly tuition dependent (table 3b). There was no 
general pattern of tuition increases over the decade. The 
college actually had tuition decreases three years, small 
hikes in some years, and substantial increases in others. 
College officials cite the University of Illinois as a 
leading competitor that has impact on its ability to raise 
tuition beyond the levels it has already reached. 
Prospective students and families are very price sensitive 
and the flagship university is a very low cost option with 
a very strong reputation. In addition, they have to 
compete with eight other Liberal Arts I colleges in 
Illinois for students.
College officials believe they have reached a tuition 
threshold and they do not believe this is a source that 
they can turn to in the future (Strassburger, 1992. Based 
on past experience this is going to very difficult for the 
college to accomplish. The college realizes its greatest 
increase in total current fund revenue when it increases 
tuition significantly. While they seek to become less 
tuition dependent this has been one of the primary income
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sources that they have had to turn in the past, which has 
caused Knox to actually increase their tuition dependence 
over the 1980s.
From the mid-1970s Knox has been able to increase its 
endowment to $35 million. This has translated into an 
increasing source of revenue for the college. Total income 
from the college's endowment fluctuated over the years as 
well as the percentage of income received from this revenue 
source. But overall it increased as an income source (40%) 
and as the percentage of overall income from 1979-1989 
(table 4b). During this period the college was in a 
capital campaign with a goal of raising $16 million but 
actually ended up reaching $22 million. It appears that 
the college underestimated some of the loyalty and support 
it could generate. Given that this campaign was completed 
in the early 1990s, it will be a while before they can gear 
up for another capital campaign and the college will 
probably have to be satisfied with the current level of 
income derived from endowment.
When college officials look to the future they believe 
that added revenue will have to come from philanthropic 
sources. However, Knox's recent past suggests that they 
should not be too optimistic about this revenue source 
unless they are able reverse the trends of the past decade. 
Income received from private gifts, grants, and contracts 
decreased 30% over the decade in real terms and also
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decreased substantially as a percentage of total income 
received (table 5b). Knox only has about a 24% alumni 
giving rate which would have to improve substantially if 
this is to become an added revenue source. In general, 
this has been a revenue source that the college cannot 
depend on, using past performance as an indicator.
Knox does not report any income from local government 
grants and contracts but does receive a small amount of 
resources from the state through grants, contracts and 
direct appropriations. Unlike Wisconsin, Illinois does 
provide direct grants to independent institutions through 
several grant programs. One of them is the Higher 
Education Cooperation Act (HECA). The purpose of these 
funds is to "achieve an effective use of the state's 
educational resource, to extend access to educational 
services throughout the state, and to develop innovative 
approaches for delivering needed educational services." 
Other state grants include Health Services Education Grants 
and the Engineering Equipment Grant Program. Direct 
appropriations and grants and contracts from the state have 
had an insignificant impact on Knox's revenues, comprising 
only about 1% of its income and this was a declining 
resource over the decade (table 6b) .
Income derived from federal government grants and 
contracts is greater due to overall increases of 62% over 
the decade. But again this has been an erratic income
source that produces only around 2-3% of annual income 
{table 7b). The undergraduate teaching mission and liberal 
arts program of Knox limits their ability to secure funds 
from state and federal sources in the form of grants and 
contracts. These funds are simply not targeted for 
undergraduate colleges. Colleges officials would like to 
see this change and want to have federal and state grants 
from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the 
National Science Foundation become more available to 
undergraduate research projects. A public policy change in 
this area of government funding could have a positive 
financial impact on a liberal arts college such as Knox 
that is experiencing increasing costs to support 
undergraduate research projects.
The last source of revenue that has any significant 
impact on Knox's income producing ability is from their 
auxiliary enterprises. This source is directly related to 
enrollment due to the fees charge for their use. The 
income derived from these self-supporting activities 
increased almost 18% over the decade (table 8b). This in 
turn adds to the price of attendance at the college. When 
the college had enrollment shortfalls the revenue from 
these sources declined but as a percentage of total income 
auxiliary enterprises consistently provide around 20% of 
the revenues received by the college in a given year.
Throughout the 1980s Knox was able to minimally
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increase its revenue base. The college always has been and 
today is even more dependent on tuition as well as the fees 
charged to students to provide a variety of services that 
the students need and demand. These trends are not 
positive signs for the future unless the college is able to 
turn them around. The only positive trend was that the 
endowment grew and the income from that source helped 
offset some of the growing expenditures. As we will see 
this very minimal income growth has direct impact on the 
college's spending patterns.
Institutional Expenditure Patterns
The relationship of annual revenues and available 
resources for education and general expenditures (E&G) is 
evident when the changes each year are analyzed. Between 
1979 and 1984, when the college was experiencing enrollment 
declines overall spending declined in some years and showed 
a small increase in others (table 9b). Spending per 
student increased as fewer students shared the available 
resources. However, this trend did not begin to occur 
until tuition started to rise above the inflation rate. 
Budgets are based on expected enrollment levels and when 
these goals are not reached fixed costs are absorbed by 
fewer students and do not necessarily reflect a qualitative 
increase.
Overall spending for E&G sources increased $200,000 a 
year on the average and dollars-per-student spent averaged
only $177. This translates into a modest growth rate in 
total E&G expenditures of 3% annually. Approximately 50% 
of the E&G expenditures go to employee salaries, wages and 
fringe benefit compensation. Unfortunately, there was no 
trend information available on salaries over the decade 
because these data have only been collected by the IPEDS 
since 1988. However, mere totals do not reveal changing 
priorities and needs of Knox over the past decade. This 
can only be realized by looking at individual expenditure 
categories and the changes that have occurred within them.
As would be expected, the largest amount of money 
spent at Knox is devoted to instructional expenditures. 
While the overall increase for total education and general 
expenditures at Knox increased by 31%, the amount related 
to instruction only increased by 6%. In fact, without a 
substantial increase in 1989 there would have been actual 
decreases in overall instructional spending (table 10b). 
Spending per student showed reductions over the decade 
until 1989 when there was a substantial increase. The 
amounts designated for instruction took an increasingly 
smaller percentage of the total E&G expenditures as the 
decade progressed. With the exception of faculty and staff 
salaries, which were only increased to meet inflation, 
academic departments have had to do more with less.
Salaries for instructional staff comprise 63% of the total 
dollars spent for instructional purposes. The
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administration all but ignored inflation in the budget 
process throughout the decade, so departments had less 
purchasing power for the dollars they received through the 
budget process.
In academic areas Knox has been in a low or no growth 
state. For every dollar spent in an area they had to take 
away dollars from another based on what was viewed as the 
most important and needed programs. This meant not only 
slight cuts at the periphery but administrators were also 
forced to make some difficult decisions about entire 
academic programs. Over the decade the college has been 
forced to eliminate speech and there were also cutbacks in 
sociology and religion. All of these cuts were made 
through attrition and not through lay-offs of tenured 
faculty.
In 1983 Knox dropped their geology program. The 
department could not sustain itself and was no longer 
considered efficient, so the contract of an untenured 
faculty member was not renewed and a tenured faculty member 
subsequently resigned. Even though this was accomplished 
through attrition it was described as a "painful process." 
There were no specific figures available to account for the 
savings from eliminating an entire program but science 
programs do tend to be expensive. They require continual 
expenditures on equipment and when enrollment in the 
program waned its cost-effectiveness decreased and the
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monies from geology and the other cut departments were used 
to fund new academic priorities.
The cuts that were made in these areas allowed the 
college to add computer science, Japanese, and a Black 
studies program. These added programs were viewed either 
as needed or compatible with the college's distinctive 
traditions. The college was integrated before the Civil 
War and had one of the first Black college graduates in the 
country, and a Black studies program was a way to continue 
the distinctiveness of their past. While it was not 
mentioned in interviews it would be reasonable to assume 
that this would help the attract and retain minority 
students, who make up a significant percentage (21%) of the 
student body. In general, the programs added tend to be 
more attractive to potential students and reflect the needs 
of a changing society. Unfortunately for Knox, academic 
program changes and additions could only have been made by 
cutting other academic programs.
As enrollments increased in the latter part of the 
decade there was not a subsequent increase in faculty and 
this had an impact on the college's student-faculty ratio. 
What was once a faculty of one hundred in 1972 was reduced 
to eighty by the early 1990s. The enrollment increase was 
only slight causing the ratio to increase from 12:1 to 13:1 
by the end of the decade. Average class size also 
increased which was also due to a change in the teaching
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load required of professors. Certainly these are not 
dramatic changes that have immediate negative impact on 
overall academic quality, however, these are not positive 
trends given Knox's distinctive mission. If these types of 
trends were to continue they could have impact on the 
perceived quality of the institution's academic program. 
These measures save money in the short-term but have the 
potential to have the college forfeit one of its primary 
attractions, small classes and close attention in the 
classroom.
At the same time faculty teaching loads were reduced 
from seven to six classes per year. In actuality the time 
spent with instruction did not decrease as more students 
took on honors projects and independent studies that are 
not credited to a faculty member's teaching load. So while 
the average class became slightly larger more students were 
offered individual attention by the college's faculty.
Once again, Knox was not able to offer a new innovation to 
their curriculum without giving something up. Even though 
college officials report that student research is becoming 
an increasingly costly budget item for the college as there 
is little research grant money targeted for undergraduate 
students, they do not list any research expenditures in 
HEGIS/IPEDS surveys.
In general, Knox has not had the money available to 
experiment with the academic program and as the
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administration looks to the future they do not have any 
plans to hire new faculty. They plan to look long and hard 
at their needs when a teaching position is vacated through 
attrition, to determine whether they will fill the 
position. They have targeted in the past, and will 
continue to look for, faculty members with an 
interdisciplinary focus who can teach more than one subject 
and add to the interdisciplinary offerings of the college. 
The one subject they would like to add is a degree program 
in international studies. This is viewed as one of their 
unmet academic needs and one of their past curricular 
strengths. If they are able to free up the money for an 
added discipline they will look for a faculty member who is 
also trained in a Latin American subfield to diversify 
their academic offerings (Strassburger, 1992).
Academic support services represent a relatively small 
percentage of total E&G expenditures at Knox but there was 
a significant increase of 48% for these services over the 
decade (table lib). Salaries comprise 42% of expenditures 
for academic support. With little course and curriculum 
development over that period most of the increase of non­
library spending went to computer support by adding a 
computer center director. Library expenditures are 
considered academic support in the rubric of HEGIS/IPEDS 
and they are reported separately. Library spending 
increased by 29% and accounted for the majority of spending
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for academic support services (table lib). Overall 
spending for the library represented roughly the same 
percentage of total E&G expenditures but it did begin to 
decline slightly near the end of the decade.
Non-library spending increased by 203% in real terms 
throughout the 1980s but still only accounts for around 1% 
of E&G expenditures (table 12b). Two of the identified 
unmet needs that will require substantial addition revenues 
in the future are the establishment of a writing center and 
an international center with directors to manage each of 
the facilities (Strassburger, 1992). The additional 
administrators could also enhance the English and political 
science/international relations program and this would 
require additional expenditures for both instruction and 
instructional support. This is another example of how a 
college's costs increase as they try to improve their 
programs and offer more services to students in an effort 
to attract students in a competitive environment.
Like other liberal arts colleges in the era of 
increasing competition for students, Knox increased the 
services it offered its students. This has led to a 54% 
increase in student services expenditures. Even in years 
when enrollments were declining student service 
expenditures increased (table 14b). This was primarily due 
to money spent on student recruitment, which is one of the 
items included in HEGIS/IPEDS student services
expenditures. The college invested more money than before 
on publications and also increased the salaries of its 
admissions personnel (Strassburger, 1992). Overall 
salaries for student services personnel comprised 43% of 
expenditures for student services. The college realized 
the need to hire a more professional core of admissions 
officers which precipitated a salary increase, and in 
addition, a director of minority student affairs was hired 
to improve student services, programming and retention of 
minority students. Not only did the total dollar amount 
rise but the percentage of total E&G expenditures and 
dollars-per-student devoted to student services increased 
over the decade.
Knox confronted the challenges of the 1980s by adding 
a whole new layer of management for institutional planning. 
These responsibilities were placed under the supervision of 
a dean of enrollment and institutional planning. Concerns 
about enrollment and the increasing competition for 
students has led the college to become very concerned with 
developing admissions and enrollment plans. Strategic 
planning at one time may have been considered a luxury but 
now is an important function of a well-run college. Such 
plans are expensive endeavors primarily due to personnel- 
related costs that make salaries alone comprise 44% of 
expenditures related to institutional support. The college 
has also added nonacademic positions in development and
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public relations to meet the new needs and help generate 
needed revenues.
College official have reacted not only by internal 
organizational changes but they have also looked to the 
outside for expert advice, and consultants costs have also 
helped fuel the expenditure increase for institutional 
support. Over the 1980s, Knox increasingly looked to 
marketing, admissions, and planning consultants to provide 
advice and help them develop strategic plans (Strassburger,
1992) .
Planning and managing Knox throughout the 1980s caused 
instructional support expenditures to rise 28% to cover the 
costs associated with these activities (table 15b). It is 
evident that as Knox began to experience enrollment 
problems they increased their spending for institutional 
support. This is no small item considering that the costs 
associated with managing and promoting the organization 
comprise 19% of the college's annual expenditures.
At the time of this study Knox was in the middle of 
space utilization study in anticipation of renovating a 
building that had been vacant for close to 10 years. This 
type of activity is a good example of the changing attitude 
at small colleges today. Conducting a study of this type 
was all but unheard of during the Golden Years, when the 
renovation would likely just have been done. The need to 
be better managed and to plan strategically reflects the
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administrative concern for improved financial management 
and resource utilization.
In the early 1970s when enrollments were at the 
highest level the college began a building program that was 
described as "out of wac." As enrollments declined in 
subsequent years it appears that Knox was not able to 
maintain or simply did not need its entire physical plant 
and an entire building was left unused. But during the 
same period a $5 million fieldhouse was built, there were 
$3 million dollars in library renovations, and millions 
were spent on scientific equipment. Just as students need 
and demand more services, they also have certain 
expectations about the physical plant and academic 
facilities of the college they attend, and this led to 
increasing costs for Knox.
One of the few areas where there was an expenditure 
decrease was in the operation and maintenance of the 
college's physical plant. In some years the college had to 
increase its expenditures for this source but there were 
declines in others, representing no distinct pattern (table 
16b). The total percent change from 1979 to 1989 does not 
truly represent the overall changes in spending for 
operation and maintenance of the college's physical plant. 
There were several years when the actual dollars spent 
exceeded the 1979 figure, but even when total dollars spent 
increased the college spent a lower percentage of its total
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E&G expenditures on plant maintenance and operations.
The greatest single expenditure increase at Knox over 
the 1980s was for scholarship and grant aid, with a 200% 
increase in funds used or these purposes (table 17b). This 
is partially but not exclusively due to tuition increases. 
There is a direct link between tuition increases and 
corresponding increases in aid to offset the additional 
costs distributed to students receiving aid. But over that 
period the rise in student financial aid expenditures far 
exceeded tuition increases. One explanation for this rise 
is changes in the Monetary Award Program (MAP), the major 
source of need-based student financial assistance provided 
by Illinois. The MAP program provides need-based grants to 
Illinois residents for undergraduate study at the state's 
colleges and universities. The maximum award is $3,500 per 
year.
Two trends mark the 10 year period when student 
financial aid expenditures were rapidly rising at Knox. 
Every year the Board of Higher Education has provided more 
money for the MAP program but independent institutions have 
been receiving a decreasing percentage of the money awarded 
to the program. In 1980, independent institutions were 
receiving 69% of the money provided for the program but by 
1990 this percentage was reduced to 58%. Overall the 
number of MAP recipients has increased by 26% in the 
public sector, while the number stayed essentially the same
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for the independent sector. However, these changes could 
be due to growth in public sector enrollments and student 
body composition and there can be no definitive statement 
made that the independent sector is being unfairly treated 
in this program. Even though there can be no definitive 
conclusion made, the fact that average parental income of 
students at the flagship university, Knox's top competitor 
for students, is higher than in the independent sector, it 
indicates that there is a disproportionate amount of 
student aid dollars going to the public sector. An even 
more revealing statistic is that in 1980 MAP maximum awards 
were 52% of independent colleges' and universities' tuition 
in Illinois and by 1991 they made up only 3 9% of tuition.
Another source of scholarship and grant expenditure is 
provided by the federal government through Pell Grants.
But when Pell Grants are factored out of total scholarship 
and grant expenditures a decreasing amount of federal aid 
from this source is revealed (tables 18b). In 1989 Pell 
Grants given to Knox students totalled $225,000 which was 
11% of the total dollars spent for scholarships and 
fellowships. Other federal grants and scholarships 
contributed another $49,000 to Knox's student aid 
expenditures. This leaves institutions like Knox to make 
up the difference of declining state and federal aid with 
institutional grant money, which means that the majority of 
the 200% increase in scholarship and grant expenditures was
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provided by the institution. In 1989 the college spent 
$1,755,000 for scholarships and fellowships, which 
comprised 87% of the student aid expenditures.
It should be pointed out that not all of these 
expenditures were for need-based assistance and merit-based 
awards have a significant influence on student financial 
aid expenditures. Knox sponsors National Merit Scholars 
with awards ranging from $750 to $2,000 a year for students 
selected by the National Merit Corporation who indicate 
Knox as their first choice institution. There are several 
other awards available to entering freshmen in addition to 
the numerous endowed scholarship available for returning 
students. The two major programs are the Knox Scholars and 
Knox Presidential Scholars programs. Knox offers 10 
Presidential Scholarships at $5,500 per year and 
approximately 60 Knox Scholars receive academic awards 
ranging from $1,000 to $4,500. There are .several other 
merit awards offered for creative arts ability and for 
students who participated in the American Field Service 
programs.
Approximately 75% percent of Knox's scholarship and 
grant money comes from unrestricted general funds.
Reducing the price for the better students offsets tuition 
increases and diminishes even further the true income 
derived from tuition. Clearly, the competition for 
students with other private colleges, and at the same time
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trying to stay reasonably price competitive with the public 
colleges and universities in Illinois, has become a very 
expensive endeavor for Knox. College officials do not 
believe that they can look to the state for anymore help 
with their need-based aid program because like most states 
Illinois is also experiencing financial problems. The 
ever-increasing aid expenditures and the high percentage of 
E&G expenditures devoted to scholarships and grants is a 
trend that could threaten Knox financially in the future. 
The Financial Condition
Knox College is showing almost all the signs of an 
institution that is in financial difficulty. When this 
study began in early 1992 Knox was deficit-spending due to 
enrollment shortfalls in the preceding year. Over the ten 
year period the college exhibited several other indicators 
of financial stress. The number faculty was reduced 
through attrition and there were corresponding increases in 
student-faculty ratios and class size. The college even 
had to eliminate an entire academic program and there were 
cuts in several other departments to allow for reallocation 
of money to other areas. In general, the increases in 
total E&G spending did not relate to an improved academic 
program but were absorbed by areas not directly related to 
instruction. There is no plan for program growth in the 
future and the college goal is to keep faculty salaries at 
the inflation rate (Strassburger, 1992). Knox has not been
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able to keep up with the knowledge or technology explosion. 
Neither their library nor administration are computerized. 
They do not have the funds available for enhancing their 
computer support at this time and they are considering 
borrowing to fund these needed improvements (Strassburger, 
1992) .
Administrative costs became an increasing burden for 
the college and absorbed a significant amount of the 
increased revenues that they were able to generate. But 
this would be expected in an era marked by demographic 
decline and increasing competition for students and 
philanthropic dollars. The competitive external 
environment appears to taking a financial toll on Knox.
The vast majority of the increases in administrative were 
directly related to generating income and strategically 
planning the future of the institution. This can not 
necessarily be considered a negative trend but one that is 
a reality of the situation colleges like Knox faced in the 
1980s and will continue to face in the 1990s.
In general, the college was able to maintain its 
admissions profile but was not able to improve to the point 
that allows much cushion if there were a reduced number of 
applications. At Knox this led to enrollment shortfalls 
and the financial problems associated with an underenrolled 
college. To help maintain a competitive position, merit- 
based aid has helped fuel the dramatically increasing
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scholarship and grant expenditures. Appropriations from 
the state and federal government do not appear to be 
helping the college meet its financial aid needs based on 
aggregate data of state funding for independent 
institutions. But this is very difficult to determine 
because in HEGIS/XPEDS data merit-based scholarship aid is 
not factored out of the scholarship and grant expenditures 
category. At a minimum Knox has 70 students enrolling each 
year as freshmen receiving merit-based assistance.
In spite of the past trends and present situation 
officials are optimistic about the future. As Vice 
President for Academic Affairs John Strassburger stated, 
"Knox today is more clear about what its strengths are and 
this clarity will transfer into a more promising admissions 
picture." If tuition has hit a threshold then there is 
going to be an increasing burden on student recruitment. 
Knox will need the additional revenues generated by 
bringing the college up to its optimal enrollment of 1,150. 
The combination of the demographic trends of the prior 
decade and a location in a state with a relatively high 
number of similar institutions has made surviving much more 
difficult for Knox than for peer institutions in growing 
states with less competition. However, these are 
circumstances colleges like Knox cannot change, but 
challenges they must plan to confront. The demographic 
trends predict a brighter situation, but as noted already
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the increased number of high school graduates will be 
increasingly from minority and low income backgrounds which 
put even further burdens on the bloated financial aid 
budget. But at least Knox is in a good position because it 
does have a tradition of strong minority student 
enrollment. Due to early integration and strategic efforts 
the college has a 21% minority representation, which is 
impressive for a small, rural college.
Given Knox's recent financial history and trends, the 
challenges ahead are formidable. The college's scramble 
for financial resources has led to them increase tuition 
rates well beyond inflation. Other income sources did not 
represent any significant increase with the exception of 
endowment income. Unless there is some significant change 
from past trends Knox will have to settle for no growth. 
Even to accomplish this the school will have to reduce 
expenditures that have been growing well beyond inflation 
rates. Once again, the financial future is probably going 
to be dependent on admissions and the college's ability to 
raise revenue through enrollment increases. The challenges 
are formidable but certainly not insurmountable for a solid 
college with a strong academic reputation located in a 
state that has a tradition of support for higher education.
V. Case Study: Carleton College
Historical Context and Base Point for Analysis
Carleton College was founded in 1866 by the Minnesota 
Conference of Congregational Churches to prepare educators 
and ministers. The college could have begun in one of five 
Minnesota towns but 201 contributors to the "Founders Fund 
for Northfield College" sent the highest bid to the 
Congregationalists of Minnesota Territory (Boorstin, 1965) 
Originally named Northfield College, it is good example of 
a college founded by a religious denomination with local 
financial backing, that reached out to the edges of 
settlement with missionary zeal and took the name of the 
local community (Boorstin, 1965). Like many small 
denominational colleges of its time, it ran into financial 
difficulty, and five years later the struggling college, in 
need of revenues, received a private gift of $50,000 from 
William Carleton and the institution's name was changed in 
recognition of its benefactor. Although the young college 
received financial support and direction from the church, 
it was agreed upon from its founding that church control 
would end after one year and today Carleton remains a 
nonsectarian and autonomous institution. It has always 
been a coeducational college and today's enrollment of 
1,750 has approximately equal numbers of men and women.
Carleton today lays claim to national distinction and
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leverage for top students across the country. Perennially 
rated as the one of the top twenty liberal arts colleges in 
the country in influential guides such as U.S.News and 
World Report and Peterson's Guide to Competitive Colleges. 
Carleton is nationally recognized for high quality 
academics and typically ranks in the top 10 institutions 
for enrolling National Merit Scholars. Even though the 
college has under 1,800 students, it attracts students from 
all 50 states and represent over a dozen foreign countries.
It is an example of the "university college" described 
by Jencks and Riesman (1968) in The Academic Revolution.
The term "university college" characterizes undergraduate 
colleges such as Carleton that draw most of their students 
from the top tenth of the national ability distribution 
with the primary purpose to prepare students for graduate 
work. Likewise, they draw their faculty from the top 
graduate schools in the country. In fact, Carleton sends 
about 75% of its graduating classes on to graduate or 
professional school within five years of graduation and its 
faculty is very active in research in addition to their 
primary responsibility of teaching.
Carleton's consumer image in 1981 captured in the 
Insiders's Guide to Colleges highlights some of the 
characteristics that make Carleton distinctive. At that 
time it was described as a "top quality school vying for 
academic recognition( p.95, 1981)." By 1991 it had
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achieved that distinction and almost ten years after the 
initial report the college was described in The Insiders 
Guide as an "academic pressure cooker" with a "high caliber 
student body that really seems to enjoy learning." The 
authors of the guide wrote that "the most striking 
characteristic of Carleton is the close relationship that 
exists between professors and students" (p. 374, 1991). 
These are important images and characterizations to be 
recognized by the consumer for a university college.
Social life is centered primarily on the campus in a wide 
array of campus organized activities due its rural location 
in the small town of Northfield.
The community of Northfield is approximately 60 miles 
from Minnesota's urban center, Minneapolis/St. Paul. To 
make the campus attractive to students who do not want to 
isolate themselves from cosmopolitan urban life, the 
College provide regular bus service to Minneapolis/St.
Paul. It is one of three colleges located in this small 
Minnesota "college town." It is a Phi Beta Kappa 
institution and one of the 32 members of the nationally 
prestigious Consortium on Financing Higher Education 
(COFHE) in addition to being affiliated with the Associated 
Colleges of the Midwest.
Thirty-five of the 67 colleges and universities in 
Minnesota are independent, comprising 24% of the total 
enrollment in the state. Carleton is one of six Liberal
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Arts Colleges I that enroll 12,741 students, which is 31% 
of the total enrollment in Minnesota's independent sector. 
Minnesota is a state that takes a moderate role regarding 
state policies toward independent higher education (Zumeta, 
1988) . The Minnesota Higher Education Coordinating Board 
has statutory planning authority for independent higher 
education institutions and there is substantial involvement 
in planning by the independent sector. The state uses 
state policy to improve the competitive position of the 
independent sector but there is little state regulatory 
involvement (Zumeta, 1988). Funding for independent 
colleges and universities is provided through scholarship 
and grant programs, a state work-study program, and bonds 
that are provided through the Minnesota Higher Education 
Facilities Authority for buildings and equipment.
Writing in 1971, Cheit characterized Carleton as an 
institution "headed for financial trouble" and commented 
that "expenses are rising more rapidly than income. 
Foundation grants are running out. Student aid is in 
serious trouble because costs for financial aid and student 
services are increasing so rapidly. Federal aid is falling 
off. Gifts are not increasing as fast as expected, partly 
due to the decline in the stock market. Although there 
have been few campuses disturbances, they may have affected 
giving (p. 78)."
Two years later in his follow-up study Cheit
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maintained that Carleton had improved its financial 
situation. In this report, he offered the following 
comments: "Operating budgets are in balance. They have a 
long-term program for strengthening financial condition by 
increasing enrollment while maintaining faculty and staff 
constant and by initiating a major capital fund drive. A 
deficit in the student aid budget continues to grow, but 
federal and state programs, if fully funded, should help 
offset this trend (p. 31)." Even though Carleton seemed to 
have a strategic plan to deal with their financial 
situation, Cheit still maintained that if the trends he was 
observing continued the prospects for Carleton were not 
very good.
However, Carleton's competitive position is much 
stronger than either Knox or Beloit and they did not 
experience the same enrollment problems. While the other 
two colleges also draw students from around the country 
Carleton is regarded as one of the top liberal arts 
colleges in the United States. This competitive position 
was one of the factors that has led the college to emerge 
from the 1980s "on solid ground."
Cheit seemed to underestimate the impact that having a 
highly competitive admissions profile would have on the 
financial future of Carleton. In addition, Carleton never 
overextended itself in the 1980s. A part of their 
"contained and controlled growth" of the 1980s there was no
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major construction (Campbell, 1992). Unlike Beloit's and 
Knox's facility expansion in the 1980s, the last major 
building at Carleton was erected in 1975.
The college planned enrollment growth in the 1970s to 
generate needed revenues ended for all practical purposes 
by 1980 when enrollment reached 1,854 students. While the 
colleges FTE showed some fluctuations and reached an all 
time high of 1,897 in 1988, enrollments averaged 1,867 
throughout the decade (table 1c). An important point is 
that the college actually improved its admissions profile 
over these years and did not have to dip into their 
applicant pool to maintain enrollment levels. In 1982 66% 
of the enrolling class was in the top 10% of their high 
school graduating class, and by 1992 that number had 
improved substantially to 74%.
In 1980 Carleton began to increase the number of 
faculty members to reduce the student-faculty ratio and 
expand course offerings. Over the decade the student- 
faculty ratio was reduced to 11:1 and average class size 
was also reduced from 20 to 18 students. The college has 
no plans for enrollment growth in the 1990s and will 
maintain the average class size and student-faculty ratios 
at the same levels (Campbell, 1992).
Over the 1980s Carleton was able to continually expand 
its revenue base from a variety of sources. From 1979 to 
1989 total current fund revenues increased every year
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except in 1981 when there was a very slight reduction 
(table 2c). Overall, this accounted for a 60% increase in 
current fund revenues with an average increase of 6% 
annually when adjusted for inflation. The income per 
student was $8,984 in 1979 and this was increased to 
$13,219 by the end of the decade. The increased revenues 
were produced from a variety of sources and the next 
section analyzes each income source category and its affect 
on total current fund revenues.
Generating the Needed Revenues
The single most important source of revenue for 
Carleton is derived from tuition and fees. A college 
official commented that "if you could have looked into a 
crystal ball in 1980 you would have seen large tuition 
increases based on the ability to command a high price" 
(Campbell,1992). The ability to command a high price is 
evident in tuition increases that were consistently well 
above inflation rates. Over the decade tuition increased 
93% with an average of 6% annually (table 3c). Tuition 
increases have had the greatest impact on total current 
fund revenue changes and the college became increasingly 
dependent on tuition and fees to provide revenues for their 
growing expenditures. In 1979 tuition and fees provided 
4 8% of current fund revenues and by 1989 this had increased 
to 57%.
Like Beloit and Knox officials, Carleton's
administration sees future constraints with tuition 
increases that exceeded inflation in the 1980s. They 
believe that the school has reached a tuition threshold.
Not only is there a concern that families are becoming 
unwilling to pay the high price, but they are seeing 
diminishing returns on the increases due to the subsequent 
student financial aid expenditures (Campbell, 1992) . For 
example, in 1991 tuition was increased 6.5% in real dollars 
but the net gain was only 3.6% due to the offset of 
financial aid. Their plan is to keep tuition and fee hikes 
at 1% to 2% above the CPI throughout the 1990s (Campbell, 
1992} . This is going to put pressure on other income 
sources to provide the sustained growth that the college 
has been able to maintain over the past decade. College 
officials look at the 1990s as a period of more modest 
growth than the 1980s for reasons that are discussed later. 
The performance of other income sources can provide some 
insight as the likelihood of other sources replacing 
tuition and fees as revenue sources in the future.
One of the income sources Carleton is looking for 
additional revenues is their endowment. The market value 
of Carleton's endowment grew from $48,890,000 in 1979 to 
$157,632,000 in 1989. Even when adjusted for inflation 
this represents a 91% endowment increase in constant 
dollars. The dramatic increase was attributed largely to 
an expanding economy and stock market growth (Campbell,
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1992) . With the endowment steadily increasing, the income 
derived from the endowment increased 49% over the decade. 
Even though there were not gains in endowment income in 
some years during this period substantial gains in other 
years made up for it (table 4c). In 1979 endowment income 
provided $1,428 of revenue per student and this increased 
to $1,948 of revenue per student, by 1989. At Carleton this 
is substantial source of income, typically providing 15% or 
more of their total current fund revenues.
The additional revenue coming from the endowment is 
important as the college tries to reduce its tuition 
dependence in the future. The college was in the planning 
stages of another capital campaign in 1992. The thrust of 
the campaign will be to raise money for facilities, 
targeting mathematics, computers for academic computing, 
biology, and physics. Facilities are viewed as one of the 
unmet needs of Carleton as it emerged from the 1980s and 
the capital campaign is targeted to meet these needs. The 
facility needs are not due to planned enrollment growth but 
are to enhance the academic program which helps the college 
maintain its competitive position and its ability to 
attract students (Campbell, 1992). To provide the manpower 
for the new campaign the college plans on adding to the 
development staff. This will not be a revenue drain as 
fund raising staffs are typically able to generate income 
that offsets their employment costs.
Historically Carleton has not been very aggressive in 
raising funds from alumni and other contributors to the 
annual fund {Campbell, 1992). The result has been a lower 
rate of giving and lower average gift than their peer 
institutions in the COFHE group. This is viewed by college 
officials as good potential source of additional revenue in 
lieu of above-inflation tuition increases in the future 
(Campbell, 1992). Carleton had steady revenue increases 
from 1981 to 1987 but since that time they experienced a 
decline of income derived from private gifts, grants, and 
contracts. Even with the two year downturn, income from 
these sources increased by 16% over the decade (table 5c). 
College officials maintain that during the years of strong 
economic growth they were able to increase income from 
these sources but as the economy turned into a slow-growth 
or no-growth phase it became increasingly difficult to 
bring in more money from these sources (Campbell, 1992).
There has also been a shift in giving from the private 
to public sector. This is due in part by the corporate 
sector's designation of a large percentage of its 
restricted gifts for research that can capture a return on 
their investment (Minnesota Private College Research 
Foundation, 1990). When research is the target of 
corporate giving, it leaves a liberal arts colleges like 
Carleton at a distinct disadvantage to the research- 
oriented University of Minnesota. In addition, the state
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began a matching grant program in 1983 to stimulate 
corporate contributions to the flagship university. When 
indirect (through tax incentives) and direct corporate 
contributions are considered, the public sector receives 16 
dollars for every one in the private sector (Minnesota 
Private College Research Foundation, 1990).
State and government appropriations, as well as state 
grants and state contracts, have minimal impact on 
Carleton. Even though state appropriations declined by 24% 
this had little impact on their current fund revenues 
(table 6c). State government contracts increased 108% over 
the decade, but again this had little impact on current 
fund revenues (table, 7c). At the highest year the two 
combined only accounted for 1.5% of total current fund 
revenues in a year. Most of the income from the state 
comes from tax exemptions, that are either direct or 
indirect, such as tax write-offs for private donations, and 
from scholarships and grants that are discussed in more 
detail later.
Federal government grants and contracts increased at 
Carleton 33% over the 1980s. The overall increase would 
have been much higher except there was a significant 
reduction in income from this source. In general, federal 
government grants and contracts provide about 3% of 
Carleton's total current fund revenues, but this source of 
income has proved to be erratic, with substantial gains in
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some years followed by reductions the next, (table 8c). 
Carleton's emphasis on undergraduate teaching limits their 
ability to attract federal grants and contracts, but given 
the federal government's unstable funding for these 
purposes it leaves institutions that are not dependent on 
this source more in control of their destiny. However, a 
public policy change that targeted research money on 
undergraduates would certainly be a welcome source of 
income at any college or university to help offset the 
costs of student research.
While Carleton does bring in revenues from other 
sources, and income from other sources has increased by 67% 
over the decade, the final category that has significant 
impact on current fund revenues is from auxiliary 
enterprises. Income from auxiliary enterprises slowly but 
steadily increased over the 1980s. The amount of revenue 
generated increase as a total and dollars-per-student 
auxiliary enterprises decreased as a percentage of total 
current fund revenues (table 9c).
Based on these observations, the performance of the 
economy and public policy agendas will have a substantial 
affect on Carleton's ability to increase revenue from 
philanthropic sources and from their endowment, which is 
heavily invested in the stock market. The trends from the 
1980s reveal that the performance of the economy had 
substantial impact on most college's ability to increase
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revenues. The growth years of the 1980s not only helped 
Carleton increase income related to annual giving and the 
endowment, but also was one of the factors that allowed it 
to raise tuition and fees substantially above the rate of 
inflation. Certainly Carleton's national reputation and 
high selectivity index has an impact on the amount of 
tuition they are able to charge and the enrollment 
stability that they experienced over the decade in the face 
of declining demographics.
If colleges officials are correct about reaching a 
tuition threshold, the college will have to look 
increasingly at other sources of revenue to maintain 
growth. Their past experience suggests that there is 
reason to believe Carleton has the capacity to turn to 
these sources to provide the needed revenues to sustain and 
enhance its academic programs, student services, and 
facilities. This will be important because college 
officials foresee decreasing state support in the 1990s. 
After years of steady growth, the state economy has slowed 
and the state is experiencing financial problems that 
affects the flow of resources to colleges and universities. 
The college has also had to pick up the slack for deceasing 
federal expenditures and officials are not optimistic about 
a reverse in this trend either.
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Institutional Expenditure Patterns
Carleton's ability to generate revenues well above the 
inflation rate provided the college with the financial 
resources to substantially increase its expenditures for 
educational and general expenditures (E&G). From 1979 to 
1989 the college's E&G expenditures increased each year, 
representing a 77% rise in spending. This resulted in per- 
student spending increasing from $6,595 in 1979 to $10,686 
in 1989, a 62% increase in constant dollars adjusted for 
inflation (table 10c). 1989 figures reveal that close to
one-half of these expenditures are related to salaries and 
fringe benefits. Much of the increase can be attributed to 
tuition increases but other sources of revenue also played 
an important role in the colleges average growth rate of 
over 7%. How the increased revenues generated by the 
college were utilized and the institutional priorities for 
spending are addressed in an analysis of Carleton's 
expenditures by HEGIS/IPEDS categories.
As might be expected, Carleton's greatest single 
expense is directly related to instruction, and over the 
decade instructional expenditures increased 62%. In 1979 
the college averaged spending $2,582 per student for 
instructional purposes and by 1989 this had risen to $3,833 
(table 12c). College officials estimate that 15-20% of 
this growth was academic program related (Campbell, 1992). 
The majority of the remainder was tied to salaries, which
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represents approximately 64% of instructional expenditures. 
Even though there were large increases overall, fewer of 
Carleton's expenditures were spent on instruction at the 
end of the decade as compared to the beginning. Other 
areas of the college began to consume the college's 
resources.
In 1980 the college began to increase the number of 
faculty to reduce the student-faculty ratio that had risen 
as part of their strategy in the 1970s to balance income 
and expenditures. The increase in the number of faculty 
was also to allow more course offerings. Most of the 
faculty increases were based on two-three year grants that 
were running out by the early 1990s and creating financial 
pressures to fill the vacancies and maintain the 
improvements realized in the 1980s. College officials are 
confident in their ability to accomplish this because they 
have an aging faculty nearing retirement and they are 
phasing in an early retirement program. Typically 
compensating new faculty members is less expensive, which 
should allow the college to maintain a balance in the long 
run (Campbell, 1992).
Over the decade Carleton added several new departments 
largely, but not exclusively, through reshuffling from 
traditional disciplines to interdisciplinary studies. The 
college's curricular experiments primarily involved trying 
more interdisciplinary programs such as African-American
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studies, women's studies, and area studies utilizing the 
faculty members from traditional disciplines. There were 
no cutbacks in any departments to provide money for new 
programs and any reallocations were described as minor 
(Campbell, 1992). All departments had modest increases 
each year throughout the decade, with some departments 
receiving slightly less than others. No departments or 
programs were cut back or eliminated due to underenrollment 
or inefficiency. In fact, Carleton does not even determine 
cost of education for students in different programs 
(Campbell, 1992).
In the 1990s, colleges officials anticipate very 
modest growth, largely through substitution. Academic 
program growth will again come primarily in 
interdisciplinary studies utilizing existing faculty. 
Programs such as international and area studies are being 
targeted (Campbell, 1992) . Predicting that inflation in 
the 1990s will be around 3.5% to 4% annually, the 
administration plans to increase faculty salaries about 1- 
1.5% above the inflation rate. They want to maintain a 
competitive salary base compared with their peer 
institutions, the members of the Consortium on Financing 
Higher Education. At the time of this study they were 
slightly below this group and increases above the inflation 
rate are designed to bring about parity.
The cost of supporting the primary mission of
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instruction, research, and public service at Carleton 
increased dramatically over the last decade. The 
expenditures for academic support services increased 104% 
from 1979-1989 (table 12c). Not only did expenditures 
increase but they slowly consumed a greater share of total 
E&G expenditures. In 1979 the college spent $483 per 
student for academic support and by 1989 this had increased 
to $905. The vast majority of the increase was in non­
library support, which includes such items as curriculum 
development, academic research, computing support, and 
academic administration (table 13c). In 1979 only $129 
were spent per student for non-library academic support and 
by 1989 it had increased to $406 per student.
Actively developing academic programs such as 
Carleton's interdisciplinary programs utilizes existing 
teaching staff, but managing change is an added expense.
In addition, the knowledge and technology explosion has had 
an impact on the amount of money devoted to academic 
support. Library expenditures increased 54% over the 
decade and dollars-per-student increased from $354 to $499 
annually (table 14c). When the administration looks to the 
future, academic support is cited as an institutional 
priority. Library acquisitions, especially for academic 
journals, and academic computing are at the top of the 
priority list and expenditures are planned to be above 
inflation. These areas will consume the modest growth
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planned, with the remainder of the academic programs and 
academic support services increases linked to the inflation 
rate (Campbell, 1992) .
The increasing needs and demands of students today has 
already been addressed in the analyses of Beloit and Knox. 
As noted, providing certain student services today is 
essential in the competitive consumer-oriented higher 
education market. This has led to constant increases in 
student services expenditures at Carleton. Student 
services expenditures increased 65% over the 1980s. In 
1979 $772 were spent per student annually and by 1989 this 
had increased to $1,168 per student (table 15c). While 
overall expenditures increased, the college was devoting 
less of its E&G expenditures to student services. One of 
the reasons for this is that Carleton keeps itself very 
lean in nonacademic personnel. In areas such as student 
services college officials estimate that they have 
approximately 25% less staff than other members of the 
Associated Colleges of the Midwest (Campbell, 1992) . When 
considering non academic employees in areas such as student 
services, Carleton bases its comparisons on ACM 
institutions. Salaries comprise approximately 43% of 
student services expenditures at Carleton. Overall, the 
college has a "do more with less" attitude when it comes to 
student services administration.
Overall Carleton is showing the signs of being an
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increasingly expensive institution to manage. This holds 
true not only for student services administration but for 
administrative costs in general. Institutional support 
expenditures increased 102% over the preceding decade. In 
1979 the college was spending $967 per student for 
institutional support and by the end of the decade this had 
increased to $1794 per student annually (table 16c) .
College officials cite dramatically increasing legal fees, 
ranging from employment law to liability law, as one of the 
factors leading to increased costs in this area (Campbell, 
1992) .
Carleton has initiated a couple of programs to 
increase their administrative efficiency and bring down the 
administrative expenditures that have been rapidly rising 
over the preceding decade. All managers follow management 
by objectives (MBO) in their departments and in the early 
1990s a management training program was initiated. 
Management training at Carleton is primarily an in-house 
program, except when outside speakers are occasionally 
brought in to address specific topics. A management 
leadership inventory is used to measure motivation, 
leadership, and productivity. Based on the results of the 
inventory, goals are set for employees. It is a voluntary 
program for administrative staff members who supervise 
three or more employees. The goal of the program is to 
work more smartly and efficiently, not harder. As already
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noted one of Carleton's greatest unmet needs is in 
facilities. In addition to the facility needs targeted for 
academic purposes, there is also a need for athletic 
facilities. The percentage of students participating in 
athletics has skyrocketed over the past decade, largely due 
to the increased number of women's sports and female 
athletes. But academic needs have taken precedence over 
athletic facility needs in past years.
Maintaining and operating the physical plant at 
Carleton has become increasing expensive at the college 
over the past decade. The cost to maintain and operate the 
physical plant has increased 39% from 1979 to 1989. Over 
the years, maintenance costs have steadily risen but by the 
end of the 1980s expenditures for these purposes were 
taking a slightly smaller share of total E&G expenditures 
(table 17c). Certainly upgrading and improving facilities 
in the future will create a greater financial burden on the 
institution. Salaries are only approximately 28% of 
maintenance costs, with the remainder going directly into 
the physical plant. The college is also trying to increase 
the efficiency of its custodial staff by implementing set 
work standards to monitor performance (Campbell, 1992) .
The greatest single expenditure increase at Carleton 
has been for financial aid. From 1979 to 1989 spending for 
scholarships and fellowships increased 149% (table 18c). 
While there is a direct link between tuition increases and
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the expenditures for student financial aid, the financial 
aid budget has grown far beyond tuition increases. This is 
due primarily to decreased support from both the federal 
and state governments. State aid levels are influenced 
greatly by the maximum tuition level the state will 
recognize. Since 1983 state student financial aid per 
student has decreased $54 at Minnesota's private colleges, 
while it has increased $70 at the University of Minnesota 
and $38 at state universities (Minnesota Private College 
Research Foundation, 1990).
While this change has had some impact on Carleton, it 
is not as significant as it has been for other Minnesota 
independent colleges and universities, due to the 
relatively low number of Minnesota residents that attend 
the college. But this, combined with the federal 
government shifting support from gift aid to loan 
guarantees does have a significant impact on the amount of 
institutional dollars used for financial aid. In 1983 
Carleton received $340,000 in federal Pell Grant money and 
by 1989 that amount had reduced 48% to $175,000 in constant 
dollars. In 1987, the amount was as low as $101,000.
Breakdowns of federal, state, and private student aid 
expenditures have only been gathered since 1987, so it is 
difficult to recognize any long-term trends. Based on the 
three years the data were available, the federal role is 
diminishing, while the state role has been stable without
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growth, and institutional aid has been rising rapidly. In 
1989, the combination of Pell Grants and other federal aid 
programs comprised 10% of the total scholarships and 
fellowships expenditures, while state funds provided 6.7%, 
private sources funded 2.9% and the college funded 80% of 
the total expenditures for institutional scholarships and 
grants. Eighty-nine percent of the increased aid 
expenditures over the period from 1987-89 came entirely 
from institutional sources.
Institutional studies project that the college can 
sustain 10% growth in student aid annually over the coming 
years. Because they are looking to hold down tuition 
increases, the college's annual fund will target giving for 
student financial aid (Campbell, 1992). Bringing in 
dollars from outside sources other than fueling financial 
aid with tuition dollars will be essential because of the 
diminishing returns from tuition increases. In 1991 for 
example, tuition was raised 6.5% but the net gain was only 
3.6% after financial aid is factored out. College 
officials are not optimistic about increasing revenues from 
the state, so it will remain up to the college to provide 
needed revenues for financial aid to retain its commitment 
to socioeconomic and ethnic diversity.
Carleton's strong endowment has helped make it able to 
provide close to 39% of its financial aid budget from 
restricted gifts and endowment (Campbell, 1992). The
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college is able to provide numerous need-based awards to 
entering and returning students without tapping into 
general funds. The remainder of financial assistance comes 
directly from the college's general funds. In addition to 
the need-based awards Carleton also sponsors National Merit 
and Achievement Scholars. Seventy-five or more of these 
high ability students are given awards in value from $750 
to $2,000 without regard to financial need. This makes the 
college's price more attractive and more competitive with 
other independent colleges as well as public universities. 
The Financial Condition
Even though financial decision-making is "not as 
comfortable a process and budget discussions have 
intensified," according to Vice President Carol Campbell, 
Carleton is showing many of the signs of an institution in 
good financial condition. Overall the college was able to 
increase total current fund revenues for educational and 
general expenditures. They increased the funds budgeted 
for individual academic departments and instructional 
expenditures per student over the decade. At the same 
time, Carleton was able to reduce its student-faculty ratio 
and class size. The college also made significant 
additions and changes to enhance the academic program.
While Carleton entered the 1990s "on solid ground," 
they have reason to "be guarded about the future." 
Enrollment stability and their highly selective admissions
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profile provides much of the foundation for its financial 
strength. The college's very solid endowment provides even 
further strength and the coming capital campaign will 
undoubtedly provide even further security. Tuition 
increases provided the vast majority of the increased 
revenues used to improve the institution's academic program 
and services but they have shown some ability to generate 
revenue from other resources.
There are several trends that are a cause for concern 
as the college approaches the future. The college's 
dependence on tuition for revenue and public resistance to 
skyrocketing college costs will prevent the college from 
raising tuition levels above the inflation rate as they did 
in the 1980s. This means that the college will probably 
have to do more with less, unless they are able to 
significantly raise revenue from other areas such as 
private gifts and state and federal aid. Rising 
administrative and support costs have fueled the 
expenditure increase that has put pressure on the college 
to generate more and more revenue, and it appears these 
costs are competing with those directed to the academic 
program. Lastly, the dramatically-increasing cost of 
student aid is a trend that potentially threatens the 
college. However, college officials have developed a 
strategic plan and they are working on controlling these 
costs and identifying potential sources of new income. How
the plan works will be strongly influenced by external 
factors such as the economy as well as state and federal 
policy.
VI. Summary and Concluding Observations
Common Trends With Subtle Distinctions
The three colleges in this study were selected because 
they share similar institutional characteristics and 
geographic proximity that caused them to face many of the 
same challenges associated with the 1980s. The review of 
income, expenditures, program growth, and the analysis of 
Beloit's, Knox's and Carleton's financial condition based 
on Cheit's standards previously established in 1971 reveals 
several common trends that characterize these three 
selective liberal arts colleges in the Midwest over the 
previous decade. Even though there are aspects of each 
that are distinctive, with each having some unique 
challenges and situations due to historical circumstances, 
the similar trends provide evidence for conclusions to be 
made about the colleges and how they survived in the light 
of the combined challenges of fiscal stress and demographic 
decline.
Each college showed dramatic increases in E&G 
spending. They did not confront the challenges of the 
1980s as many "experts" advised with extreme cost-cutting 
measures, and while they had slightly different rates of 
growth in the different HEGIS/IPEDS categories, they all 
increased spending well above the inflation rate. To 
maintain their desirability in the competitive student
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market they competed by offering more to students who 
increasingly wanted and expected more of the college's they 
chose to attend. Many of the services such as career 
planning and placement, an array of student activities, 
psychological services, etc., that once would have been 
considered a luxury, became expected fare for higher 
education's clientele.
Providing these services became increasingly expensive 
but necessary in the 1980s. One good example exhibited by 
Beloit and Knox was that even in fairly tough financial 
times they built expensive athletic/recreation facilities 
for students. The new student consumer expects things such 
as a modern athletic facility as well as improved living 
facilities. Both Beloit and Carleton officials also cited 
the expense of keeping up with the knowledge explosion and 
investing considerable revenues in computers. These 
findings confirm what O'Keefe (1987) concluded in his case 
studies of public and private colleges, when he observed 
that the highly competitive environment resulted in policy 
choices that pushed colleges to compete more aggressively 
with one another for students and resources.
Inherent in the design of this study is the assumption 
that financially struggling colleges reduce the amount of 
spending on academic programs and other areas directly 
related to instruction and the primary mission of the 
institution. While the financially stronger Carleton
140
{based on this analysis) was able to increase expenditures 
across the board, Knox College's expenditure increases came 
primarily in areas other than instruction. As noted these 
are areas that have become essential to attracting students 
and maintaining the stable enrollments necessary to 
maintain financial stability. A common response for all 
three colleges was to enhance their academic program by 
offering more interdisciplinary studies, that take 
advantage of existing faculty and resources. While there 
were slight variations in the precise amounts of increase 
in total E&G expenditures for each college, as well as the 
percentage that they took of total E&G expenditures, the 
general trend was to spend less in this area, while other 
areas absorbed greater share of total spending.
At all of the colleges there were the signs of the 
increasing importance of expenditures devoted to 
institutional management. Administration and student 
services all grew well beyond the inflation rate. The 
external demographic factors influencing the colleges are 
evident in that administrative costs increased the most in 
revenue-generating departments such as admissions and 
development. For instance, at Knox this meant adding a 
whole new layer of administration for managing enrollments. 
The colleges that had the most difficulty maintaining 
enrollment also reported an increase in role and expense of 
outside consultants. Increased accountability requirements
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from federal and state governments also affected the 
administrative costs associated with running the colleges.
In addition to the significant increases in 
expenditures devoted to managing the ever-complex 
collegiate organization was the staggering rise in 
financial aid expenditures. Historically, outside sources 
have contributed the majority of aid expenditures at 
colleges and universities throughout the country, including 
grant and loan programs funded by the federal and state 
governments (Hubbell, 1992). But tuition has risen beyond 
average family incomes and external financial aid. This 
has left colleges such as Knox, Beloit, and Carleton to 
make up the gap between their costs, that have risen far 
beyond inflation, and the amount families can pay and 
external sources can provide. As student financial needs 
increase so too must the financial aid budget or else there 
must be greater emphasis on recruiting affluent students, 
which impacts student body composition.
The colleges' inability to control expenditures, or 
strategic avoidance of retrenchment strategies, and their 
increasing dependence on tuition as a revenue source has 
fueled the dramatic tuition increases over the past decade. 
While all of the colleges were able to raise revenues from 
a variety of sources, tuition proved to be an ever- 
important revenue source. This led to a spiraling effect 
of tuition increases requiring additional student aid
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expenditures to offset costs of student recruitment and 
retention. Overall, institutional aid has outpaced both 
federal and state spending resulting in exceedingly high 
institutional financial aid expenditures (Hubbell, 1992). 
All the colleges studied exhibited this phenomenon that has 
been observed at colleges and universities throughout the 
country.
The competitive environment for student recruitment 
also led the colleges to increase the amount of merit-based 
financial assistance in addition to their need-based 
programs. Merit-based aid programs have also helped fuel 
the increases for these expenditures. Knox presents a very 
good example of this. Among the merit-based awards 
available, at least 70 entering freshmen each year receive 
non-need scholarship grant money. This is a significant 
percentage of the incoming freshman class and this tuition 
discounting reduces the institution's revenue base. 
Selectivity appears to have an impact on these types of 
programs. Of the small sample of colleges studied, the 
most selective have the least number of and least 
aggressive non need aid programs. They have the 
competitive stature and therefore have less of a need to 
turn to this inducement for attracting top students to 
either maintain or enhance their reputation. In the end it 
is difficult to conclude what effect this has had on the 
competitive position of each of the institutions. Only one
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of the colleges had an improved admissions profile over the 
period, based on the number of student graduating in the 
top 10% of their high school class. But the drop could 
have been worse at the other two colleges without this 
inducement.
This is significant because colleges face a very- 
difficult financial situation that is linked to enrollment. 
It is better to reduce the costs for a student and have him 
enroll in order to secure revenue, even if that revenue is 
less than the school would have received if the student had 
paid the full price. Students not only bring in tuition 
revenues but also purchase the other services provided by 
the college. As we have seen from the colleges studied, 
enrollment stability and maintaining optimal enrollment is 
critical to financial stability because of the tuition and 
non-tuition revenues students provide.
This is not news to campus administrators and this 
situation has been partly responsible for much of the 
increased E&G expenditures. The need to respond to the 
demographic challenges of the 1980s predicted long before 
they occurred led to the apparent "Heisenberg Effect." 
Campus administrators anticipated the potential enrollment 
problems and allocated resources in areas necessary to 
maintain their enrollments. These increases were absorbed 
by increased administrative costs due to more services and 
better facilities being provided, as well as the need to
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offer a substantial share of the annual expenses to 
providing financial aid to students. The strategy was to 
make their campuses attractive to potential students who 
were in a buyer's market for educational services.
The income factors affecting these institutions is 
clear. The majority of the expenditure increases were 
absorbed by tuition increases. While other sources of 
revenue did increase over the decade none supplanted 
tuition as an income source. The institutions were all 
able to increase their endowments and the income derived 
from endowments, but this did not provide a greater share 
of the overall increase in income. The affect of the 
endowment of an institution is not to be underestimated. 
Clearly, it has a significant impact on the financial 
strength and stability of a college. Its impact can be 
observed directly in relation to the college's financial 
aid expenditures. Carleton's endowment far exceeds both 
Beloit's and Knox's and one of the results is less 
dependence on tuition to fund student financial aid.
While the financial picture for each college varied 
there are some positive trends for even the college 
experiencing the greatest financial stress. The tough 
financial decisions required administrators to closely 
evaluate all aspects of the institutions to eliminate waste 
and improve productivity. This is a positive result for 
the fee-paying consumer. But more importantly it required
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the colleges studied to become more clear about their 
strengths and translate that clarity into a renewed sense 
of purpose and mission.
It is important to emphasize that none of the colleges 
strayed from their primary mission. In some of the 
toughest financial times it could have been tempting to 
move to a more practical curriculum that would appeal to 
students, whose changing choice of study was geared toward 
more practical education in areas such as business 
administration, communications, and other career-related 
undergraduate professional programs. All of the colleges 
rejected changing their focus. The colleges asserted that 
their primary mission was to remain devoted to the study of 
the liberal arts, while serving a traditional student base* 
The "sea change" that Breneman spoke of did not occur at 
any of the three colleges studied. Of course, all the 
institutions are selective, and even though they vary in 
selectivity measures, this certainly aided them in 
preserving their unique and distinctive mission. In the 
early 1990s Carleton was only accepting 57% of its 
applicants and had a mean SAT of 1280; Knox was accepting 
80% of its applicants and had a mean SAT of 1045; and 
Beloit was accepting 85% of its applicants and had a mean 
SAT of 1095.
None of the colleges turned to evening divisions, 
begun to serve adult populations, or added graduate
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programs to cater to new clienteles, which could have been 
an easy revenue-producing solution to the financial and 
enrollment challenges of the 1980s. In adhering to their 
mission of providing an educational option for traditional 
students, the colleges maintained their positions and at 
the same time helped to preserve diversity, which is one of 
the distinctions and strengths of the American higher 
education system.
In this regard the colleges studied have shown 
themselves to be constantly vulnerable to the external 
environment yet persistently strong. Policy makers and 
educational leaders need to continue to worry about working 
to preserve this segment of the higher educational system 
and continue to strive to assist them in securing their 
financial future. Colleges cannot deliver a quality 
undergraduate education without a secure financial base. 
They have only so much control over their future, and 
external factors, as has been determined, play an important 
role in the financial situation of colleges.
This study included only a very small sample and 
therefore statistically significant conclusions cannot be 
made about all the liberal arts colleges in the country. 
However, it can be concluded that all of the colleges 
studied are experiencing financial stress to some degree 
and this is having an impact on expenditures that could 
threaten the heart of the educational program.
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When looking at the factors that are influencing the 
cost income squeeze of the 1980s it is apparent that 
expenditure increases are largely, although certainly not 
exclusively, due to institutional efforts to confront the 
challenges of the decade. External demographic and policy 
changes heightened the need for colleges to develop 
institutional plans for the future. But the colleges' 
aspirations to expand their activities, improve image, 
selectivity, and take on more responsibilities also played 
an important role in the rapid rise of expenditures. The 
dedication to their traditional mission and clientele 
provided a degree of renewal that was in the control of the 
individual institutions. Most of the challenges that the 
colleges faced were beyond institutional control.
The external environment was not entirely negative. 
Some of the internal effects have already been discussed 
and it is also important to recognize some of the external 
factors that helped the colleges in the 1980s. A growing 
economy resulting in personal income and stock market 
growth helped provided greater yield on endowments and 
available resources to pay increasing tuitions.
Based on the data used there can be no precise 
conclusions made about the impact of state spending. The 
aggregate data provided by the state associations 
representing independent higher education suggests that 
state spending on student aid programs and other areas
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decreased over the decade. Based on these data it could be 
assumed that state spending became less of a revenue source 
with regard to the percentage of revenue received, lagging 
behind tuition increases and increased spending. Most 
state aid for undergraduate colleges comes through state 
student financial aid programs.
The inability to make definitive conclusions about the 
impact of state student financial aid programs is due to 
inaccurate reporting by the colleges in HEGIS/IPEDS 
reports. Neither Knox nor Beloit reported any figures for 
the state scholarship and grant category yet certainly they 
received money from the state through the state tuition 
grant programs of Illinois and Wisconsin.
Administrators' Policy Views and Prospects for the Future
All of the administrators interviewed commented that 
more government spending targeted toward four-year colleges 
is needed. But this is not likely given the financial 
climate of states that are also experiencing financial 
problems and searching for ways to control their own 
expenditures. It was also suggested that research money 
targeted toward undergraduate colleges would be a 
significant policy change that would help these 
institutions not only financially but also in attracting 
top students who look for unique research opportunities 
that are now only available at research universities. 
Currently these colleges receive relatively little research
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money yet they have many students who are active in 
research.
In Minnesota, independent colleges are working 
together to lobby the legislature to raise public college 
and university tuitions to subsidize those who have 
demonstrated the ability to pay with less state money and 
provide more portable grant money. This would help further 
reduce the tuition gap and level the playing field for 
independent institutions. Given the financial climate of 
Minnesota and the other states this could be an effective 
strategy as the states look for ways to bring down 
spending. But administrators believe no measures will be 
successful unless the overall image of higher education is 
improved.
It appears that tuition has probably hit a threshold 
given the concern that has been expressed by the media, the 
Department of Education, politicians, and countless 
industry analysts and commentators who suggest that the 
cost-income squeeze identified by Cheit in 1971 will 
probably return in the 1990s. Without having the 
substantial tuition increases over the 1980s the three 
colleges could not have been able to raise the revenues 
necessary to maintain their growth over the 1980s. With 
the federal government's deficit and budget problems it 
seems unlikely that the federal role in higher education 
will substantially change from the limited role it has now.
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State governments are also experiencing financial trouble 
and limited growth prospects in the future, and it appears 
that neither will be able to substantially increase 
financial support for higher education in the future. This 
could be especially true for independent liberal arts 
colleges, since states have built a large public sector 
that also needs to be maintained.
But the fiscal policies and practices for public 
colleges and universities developed in the 1950s are coming 
under sharp criticism as reduced state funding limits their 
ability to meet an expanded scope and mission. Some of the 
policy shifts mentioned could have significant positive 
consequences for independent colleges and universities.
One college president even suggested the "heretical" idea 
that states should abandon "outmoded" practices such as low 
public tuition and heavy reliance on state tax revenues 
(Wallace, 1992). Wallace maintained that to become truly 
affordable and provide adequate access for students from 
all economic backgrounds, public colleges and universities 
should adopt the high-tuition and high-financial-aid 
policies followed by many private colleges. The goal would 
be to achieve a correlation between costs and family income 
to reduce an "unneeded subsidy" for higher-income families 
and offset the erosion of the financial foundation for 
public colleges. Policy recommendations such as this would 
significantly affect private colleges and universities by
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reducing the tuition gap that exists.
Another optimistic trend for independent colleges in 
this regard is that public colleges and universities 
decrease enrollment to solve budget problems due to state 
financing patterns that have developed. Independent 
colleges can serve as an outlet for students seeking higher 
education. This will place even greater emphasis on state 
planning and coordination to assure that education services 
and resources are efficiently distributed.
Overall the findings of this study suggest that all 
three of the colleges are experiencing financial problems 
to some degree. However, each college has its own 
individual history. This is significant because it reveals 
an even greater problem for small liberal arts colleges in 
general. These colleges are not representative of all 
small liberal arts colleges throughout the country but they 
are representative of many Liberal Arts I colleges that are 
for the most part highly selective, relatively affluent, 
and nationally visible. Their graduates pursue graduate 
study in the top graduate schools, they have visible 
alumni, and are able to recruit faculty from the leading 
graduate schools.
If these institutions are experiencing financial 
problems or at the minimum financial stress, it can lead to 
concerns about this important sector of the American system 
of higher education. The colleges discussed here were able
to maintain their commitment to their mission largely 
because of their position and reputation. Further studies 
of some of the actors in this segment of the higher 
education system would enhance our understanding of the 
problems and changes that are taking place in American 
higher education. If external policy and demographic 
factors are leading to the demise of other institutions, 
then it threatens the diversity of the higher education 
system that is one of the keys to its strength. All of the 
colleges exhibit a survival spirit, but how they survive in 
the coming decades will be played out with many individual 
stories based on each college's historic past and 
circumstances that dictate the decisions of the present.
Year |
j
i
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 1a
Beloit College
ENDOWMENT INCOME (1979 Dollars)
fotal % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
271 4.38% 275
355 5.21% 31.00% 335
433 5.81% 21.97% 410
473 5.94% 9.24% t 438
606 7.02% 28.12% 570
632 7.01% 4.29% 648
771 8.37% 21.99% 751
756 7.72% -1.95% 697
792 8.01% 4.76% 710
803 7.74% 1.39% 667
841 7.20% 4.73% 210.33% 712
Table 2a
Beloit College
PRIVATE GIFTS, GRANTS, AND CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,004 0.162 1.017
1980 1,425 0.209 0.419 ; 1.344
1981 1,415 0.190 -0 .007 ; 1.341
1982 1,582 0.199 0.118 I 1.463
1983 1,435 0.166 -0 .093 I 1.349
1984 1,440 0.160 0.003 1.475
1985 1,557 0.169 0.081 1.516
1986 1,277 0.130 -0 .180 1.178
1987 1,457 0.147 0.141 1.307
1988 1,442 0.139 -0 .010 1.199
1989 1,519 0.130 0.053 0.513 1.286
Table 3a
Beloit College 
Total Current Fund Revenues and Enrollment
Year Enrollment Current Fund 
Revenues
Amount/
Student
1979 987 6,191 6,273
1980 1,060 6,817 6,431
1981 1,055 7,452 7,064
1982 1,081 7,968 7,371
1983 1,064 8,630 8,111
1984 976 9,014 9,236
1985 1,027 9,208 8,966
1986 1,084 9,791 9,032
1987 1,115 9,890 8,870
1988 1,203 10,376 8,625
1989 1,181 11,681 9,891
Table 4a
Beloit College
Tuition and Fees (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 3,440 55.56% 3,485
1980 3,417 50.12% -0.67% 3,224
1981 3,676 49.33% 7.58% 3,484
1982 3,989 50.06% 8.51% 3,690
1983 4,596 53.26% 15.22% 4,320
1984 4,781 53.04% 4.03% 4,899
1985 4,759 51.68% -0.46% 4,634
1986 5,311 54.24% 11.60% 4,899
1987 5,361 54.21% 0.94% 4,808
1988 5,836 56.25% 8.86% 4,851
1989 6,614 56.62% 13.33% 92.27% 5,600
Table 5a
Beloit College
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS & CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 4 0.06% ! 4
1980 4 0.06% 0.00% ! 4
1981 2 0.03% -50.00% i  2
1982 69 0.87% 3350.00% I 64
1983 49 0.57% -28.99% 46
1984 8 0.09% -83.67% 8
1985 40 0.43% 400.00% 39
1986 43 0.44% 7.50% 40
1987 55 0.56% 27.91% 49
1988 49 0.47% -10.91% 41
1989 140 1.20% 185.71% 3400.00% 119
Table 6a
Beloit College
REVENUES FROM AUXILIARY ENTERPRISES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,034 16.70% 1,048
1980 1,164 17.07% 12.57% j 1,098
1981 1,212 16.26% 4.12% ! 1,149
1982 1,239 15.55% 2.23% 1,146
1983 1,421 16.47% 14.69% 1,336
1984 1,543 17.12% 8.59% 1,581
1985 1,552 16.85% 0.58% 1,511
1986 1,648 16.83% 6.19% 1,520
1987 1,634 16.52% -0.85% 1,465
1988 1,713 16.51% 4.83% 1,424
1989 1,915 16.39% 11.79% 85.20% 1,622
Table 7a
Beloit College
ADJUSTED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS & CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
(excluding Pell Grants)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 234 3.78%
I
! 237
1980 268 3.93% 14.53% ; 253
1981 515 6.91% 92.16% 488i
1982 335 4.20% -34.95% 310!
1983 253 2.93% -24.48% 238 j
1984 314 3.48% 24.11% 322j
1985 249 2.70% -20.70% 242 j
1986 380 3.88% 52.61% 351 ]
1987 289 2.92% -23.95% 2 5 9 1
1988 270 2.60% -6.57% 2 2 4 1
1989 329 2.82% 21.85% 40.60% 279 i
Table 8a
Beloit College
TOTAL E&G EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
YEAR ENROLLMENT TOTAL E & G  
EXPENDITURE
EXPENDITURE 
PER STUDENT
1979 987 5393 5.464
1980 1060 5637 5.318
1981 1055 6202 5.879
1982 1081 6365 5.888
1983 1064 6822 6.412
1984 976 7303 7.483
1985 1027 7649 7.448
1986 1084 8194 7.559
1987 1115 8348 7.487
1988 1203 8644 7.185
1989 1181 9643 8.165
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 9a
Beloit College
EXPENDITURES FOR INSTRUCTION (1979 Dollars)
"otal % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1,964 36.42% 1,990
1,762 31.26% -10.29% 1,662.
1,738 28.02% -1.36% 1,647
1,892 29.73% 8.86% 1,750
2,143 31.41% 13.27% 2,014
2,277 31.18% 6.25% 2,333
2,414 31.56% 6.02% 2,351
2,505 30.57% 3.77% 2,311
2,639 31.61% 5.35% 2,367
2,721 31.48% 3.11% 2,262
3,055 31.68% 12.27% 55.55% 2,587
Year j
_____ i
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 10a
Beloit College
ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
tal % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
307 5.69% | 311
345 6.12% 12.38% ! 325
464 7.48% 34.49% j 440
530 8.33% 14.22% 490
613 8.99% 15.66% 576
686 9.39% 11.91% 703
651 8.51% -5.10% 634
575 7.02% -11.67% 530
558 6.68% -2.96% 500
568 6.57% 1.79% 472
700 7.26% 23.24% 128.01% 593
Table 11a
Beloit College
NON-LIBRARY ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 147 2.73% 149
1980 176 3.12% 19.73% 166
1981 288 4.64% 63.64% 273
1982 344 5.40% 19.44% 318
1983 404 5.92% 17.44% 380
1984 467 6.39% 15.59% 478
1985 420 5.49% -10.06% 409
1986 324 3.95% -22.86% 299
1987 306 3.67% -5.56% 274
1988 297 3.44% -2.94% 247
1989 385 3.99% 29.63% 161.90% 326
Table 12a
Beloit College
LIBRARY EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 161 2.99% 163
1980 168 2.98% 4.35% 158
1981 176 2.84% 4.76% 167
1982 185 2.91% 5.11% 171
1983 208 3.05% 12.43% 195
1984 219 3.00% 5.29% 224
1985 231 3.02% 5.48% 225
1986 251 3.06% 8.66% 232
1987 252 3.02% 0.40% 226
1988 271 3.14% 7.54% 225
1989 316 3.28% 16.61% 96.27% 268
Year j
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 13a
Beloit College
STUDENT SERVICES EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Total
440
519
499
626
693
700
718
832
941
1,028
1,001
% of Total % Change Total
Revenues Change
8.16%
9.21% 17.95%
8.05% -3.85%
9.84% 25.45%
10.16% 10.70%
9.59% 1.01%
9.39% 2.57%
10.15% 15.88%
11.27% 13.10%
11.89% 9.25%
10.38% -2.63% 127.50%
Amount/
Student
446
490
473
579
651
717
699
768
844
855
848
Table 14a
Beloit College
SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 929 17.23% | 941
1980 840 14.90% -9 .58% I 792
1981 1,172 18.90% 39.52% I 1,111
1982 1,140 17.91% -2 .73% ! 1,055
1983 1,554 22.78% 36.32% 1,461
1984 1,745 23.89% 12.29% 1,788
1985 1,758 22.98% 0.74% 1,712
1986 1,990 24.29% 13.20% 1,836
1987 2,083 24.95% 4.67% 1,868
1988 2,046 23.67% -1 .78% 1,701
1989 2,245 23.28% 9.73% 141.66% 1,901
Table 15a
Beloit College
ADJUSTED SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIPS EXPENDITURES {1979 Dollars) 
(excluding Pell Grants)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 929 17.23%
i
| 941
1980 840 14.90% -9.58% 792
1981 1,172 18.90% 39.52% 1,111
1982 1,140 17.91% -2.73% 1,055
1983 1,390 20.38% 21.93% 1,306
1984 1,553 21.27% 11.73% 1,591
1985 1,597 20.88% 2.83% 1,555
1986 1,809 22.08% 13.27% 1,669
1987 1,875 22.46% 3.65% 1,682
1988 1,888 21.84% 0.69% 1,569
1989 2,031 21.06% 7.57% 118.62% 1,720
Table 16a
Beloit College
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
*
1979 923 17.11% 935
1980 1,096 19.44% 18.74% 1,034
1981 1,160 18.70% 5.84% 1,100
1982 1,001 15.73% -13.71% 926
1983 1,019 14.94% 1.80% 958
1984 1,065 14.58% 4.51% 1,091
1985 1,211 15.83% 13.71% 1,179
1986 1,291 15.76% 6.61% 1,191
1987 1,370 16.41% 6.12% 1,229
1988 1,491 17.25% 8.83% 1,239
1989 1,612 16.72% 8.12% 74.65% 1,365
Table 17a
Beloit College
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF PLANT (1979 Dollars)
! Year
|
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 553 10.25%
I
' 560
I 1980 683 12.12% 23.51% j  644
| 1981 780 12.58% 14.20% 739
I 1982 807 12.68% 3.46% 747
1983 791 11.59% -1.98% 743
| 1984 783 10.72% -1.01% 802
1985 770 10.07% -1.66% 750
1986 875 10.68% 13.64% 807
[ 1987 760 9.10% -13.14% 682
I 1988 739 8.55% -2.76% 614
I 1989 934 9.69% 26.39% 68.90% 791
Tables 1b and 2b
Knox College
TOTAL CURRENT FUND REVENUES AND ENROLLMENT
Year Enrollment Current Fund 
Revenues
Amount/
Student
1979 1,002 8,256 8,240
1980 972 7,808 8,033
1981 962 7,323 7,612
1982 939 8,232 8,767
1983 898 8,306 9,249
1984 903 8,366 9,265
1985 944 8,486 8,989
1986 967 9,071 9,381
1987 1,029 9,167 8,909
1988 1,024 9,960 9,727
1989 1,029 10,179 9,892
Table 3b
Knox College
TUITION AND FEES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 4,135 50.08% 4,127
1980 3,893 49.86% -5.85% 4,005
1981 3,867 52.81 % -0.67% 4,020
1982 4,130 50.17% 6.80% 4,398
1983 4,445 53.52% 7.63% 4,950
1984 4,418 52.81 % -0.61% 4,893
1985 4,490 52.91 % 1.63% 4,756
1986 4,882 53.82% 8.73% 5,049
1987 5,125 55.91% 4.98% 4,981
1988 5,552 55.74% 8.33% 5,422
1989 5,700 56.00% 2.67% 37.85% 5,539
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 4b
Knox College
ENDOWMENT INCOME (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
868 10.51%
951 12.18% 9.56%
793 10.83% -16.61%
1,040 12.63% 31.15%
1,292 15.56% 24.23%
1,193 14.26% -7.66%
1,347 15.87% 12.91%
1,260 13.89% -6.46%
1,249 13.62% -0.87%
1,179 11.84% -5.60%
1,218 11.97% 3.31% 40.32%
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 5b
Knox College
PRIVATE GIFTS, GRANTS, AND CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1,160 14.05% 1,158
934 11.96% -19.48% 961
623 8.51% -33.30% 648
915 11.12% 46.87% 974
554 6.67% -39.45% 617
762 9.11% 37.55% 844
674 7.94% -11.55% 714
762 8.40% 13.06% 788
592 6.46% -22.31% 575
900 9.04% 52.03% 879
836 8.21% -7.11% -27.93% 812
Table 6b
Knox College
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND CONTACTS
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 115 1.39% 115
1980 103 1.32% -10.43% 106
1981 96 1.31% -6.80% 100
1982 88 1.07% -8.33% ; 94
1983 81 0.98% -7.95% 90
1984 73 0.87% -9.88% 81
1985 77 0.91% 5.48% 82
1986 85 0.94% 10.39% 88
1987 91 0.99% 7.06% 88
1988 84 0.84% -7.69% 82
1989 87 0.85% 3.57% -24.35% 85
Table 7b
Knox College
ADJUSTED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS & CONTRACTS {1979 Dollars)
(excluding Pell Grants)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
"
1979 172 2.08%
i
j 172;
1980 267 3.42% 55.23% ■ 275:
1981 239 3.26% -10.49% I 248;
1982 405 4.92% 69.46% 431 :
1983 241 2.90% -40.49% 268!
1984 234 2.80% -2.90% 259i
1985 172 2.03% -26.50% 182
1986 211 2.33% 22.67% 218
1987 283 3.09% 34.12% 275 |
1988 247 2.48% -12.72% 241 |
1989 279 2.74% 12.96% 62.21 % 271 !
Table 8b
Knox College
REVENUES FROM AUXILIARY ENTERPRISES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,693 20.51% 1,690
1980 1,616 20.70% -4.55% 1,663
1981 1,512 20.65% -6.44% 1,572!
1982 1,583 19.23% 4.70% j 1,686
1983 1,665 20.05% 5.18% 1,854
1984 1,668 19.94% 0.18% 1,847
1985 1,705 20.09% 2.22% 1,806
1986 1,793 19.77% 5.16% 1,854
1987 1,790 19.53% -0.17% 1,740
1988 1,902 19.10% 6.26% 1,857
1989 1,989 19.54% 4.57% 17.48% 1,933
Table 9b
Knox College
TOTAL E&G EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
YEAR ENROLLMENT TOTAL E&G 
EXPENDITURE
EXP. PER 
STUDENT
1979 1002 6369 6.356
1980 972 5837 6.005
1981 962 5846 6.077
1982 939 6552 6.978
1983 898 6806 7.579
1984 903 6812 7.544
1985 944 7149 7.573
1986 967 7368 7.619
1987 1029 7712 7.495
1988 1024 8313 8.118
1989 1029 8363 8.127
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
19B7
1988
1989
Table 10b
Knox College
EXPENDITURES FOR INSTRUCTION (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total i 
Change j
2,613
2,417
2,397
2,406
2,509
2,347
2,275
2,372
2,405
2,592
2,780
41.03% 
41.41% 
41.00% 
36.72% 
36.86% 
34.45% 
31.82% 
32.19% 
31.19% 
31.18% 
33.24%
-7.50%
-0.83%
0.38%
4.2B%
-6.46%
-3.07%
4.26%
1.39%
7.78%
7.25% 6.39%
Table 11b
Knox College
ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 265 4.16% 264
1980 262 4.49% -1.13% i 270
1981 261 4.46% -0.38% I 271
1982 357 5.45% 36.78% ! 380
1983 364 5.35% 1.96% 405
1984 380 5.58% 4.40% 421
1985 382 5.34% 0.53% 405
1986 359 4.87% -6.02% 371
1987 375 4.86% 4.46% 364
1988 368 4.43% -1.87% 359
1989 391 4.68% 6.25% 47.55% 380
Table12b
Knox College
LIBRARY EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 235 3.69% 235
1980 262 4.49% 11.49% 270
1981 261 4.46% -0.38% 271
1982 278 4.24% 6.51% 296 :
1983 274 4.03% -1.44% 305:
1984 299 4.39% 9.12% 331 j
1985 294 4.11% -1.67% 311 j
1986 281 3.81% -4.42% 291 I
1987 297 3.85% 5.69% 289 |
1988 301 3.62% 1.35% 294I
1989 304 3.64% 1.00% 29.36% 295 |
Table 13b
Knox College
NON-LIBRARY ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 29 0.46% j 29
1980 0 0.00% -100.00% 0
1981 0 0.00% N/A 0
1982 80 1.22% N/A 85
1983 90 1.32% 12.50% 100
1984 81 1.19% -10.00% 90
1985 88 1.23% 8.64% 93
1986 79 1.07% -10.23% 82
1987 79 1.02% 0.00% 77
1988 67 0.81% -15.19% 65
1989 88 1.05% 31.34% 203.45% 86
Table 14b
Knox College
STUDENT SERVICES EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
I Year
I
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
I
I
! 1979 559 8.78% 558
j  1980 581 9.95% 3.94% 598 i
I 1981 579 9.90% -0.34% 602 i
|  1982 613 9.36% 5.87% 653 i
I 1983I 670 9.84% 9.30% 746 i
| 1984 689 10.11% 2.84% 763 |
1985 757 10.59% 9.87% 802!
1986 783 10.63% 3.43% 810]
j 1987 827 10.72% 5.62% 804
1988 917 11.03% 10.88% 896]
! 1989 860 10.28% -6.22% 53.85% 836 I
Table 15b
Knox College
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,226 19.25% I 1,224
1980 1,124 19.26% -8.32% 1,156
1981 1,041 17.81% -7.38% 1,082
1982 1,204 18.38% 15.66% 1,282
1983 1,217 17.88% 1.08% 1,355
1984 1,213 17.81% -0.33% 1,343
1985 1,379 19.29% 13.69% 1,461
1986 1,352 18.35% -1.96% 1,398
1987 1,442 18.70% 6.66% 1,401
1988 1,502 18.07% 4.16% 1,467
1989 1,570 18.77% 4.53% 28.06% 1,526
Table 16b
Knox College
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF PLANT (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 719 11.29% 718
1980 661 11.32% -8.07% 680
1981 699 11.96% 5.75% 727
1982 774 11.81 % 10.73% 824
1983 743 10.92% -4.01% 827
1984 737 10.82% -0.81% 816
1985 718 10.04% -2.58% 761
1986 723 9.81% 0.70% 748
1987 614 7.96% -15.08% 597
1988 773 9.30% 25.90% 755
1989 627 7.50% -18.89% -12.80% 609
Table 17b
Knox College
SCHOLARSHIPS AND FELLOWSHIPS EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 602 9.45% I 601
1980 442 7.57% -26.58% I 455
1981 601 10.28% 35.97% ! 625
1982 1,016 15.51% 69.05% 1,082
1983 1,219 17.91% 19.98% 1,357
1984 1,365 20.04% 11.98% 1,512
1985 1,604 22.44% 17.51% 1,699
1986 1,786 24.24% 11.35% 1,847
1987 1,954 25.34% 9.41% 1,899
1988 2,079 25.01% 6.40% 2,030
1989 2,028 24.25% -2.45% 236.88% 1,971
Table 18b
Knox College
ADJUSTED SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIPS EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
(excluding Pell Grants)
; Year
ii
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
i
1979 602 9.45% I 601
| 1980 442 7.57% -26.58% ! 455!
j 1981 601 10.28% 35.97% 625 I
| 1982 1,016 15.51% 69.05% 1,082;
1983 1,065 15.65% 4.82% 1,186 |
1984 1,199 17.60% 12.58% 1,328;
1985 1,411 19.74% 17.68% 1,495 |
1986 1,567 21.27% 11.06% 1,620 j
1987 1,706 22.12% 8.87% 1,658
j 1988 1,872 22.52% 9.73% 1,828 I
| 1989 1,803 21.56% -3.69% 199.50% 1,752 j
Tables 1c and 2c
Carleton College 
TOTAL CURRENT FUND REVENUES AND ENROLLMENT
Year Enrollment Current Fund 
Revenues
Amount/
Student
1979 1,718 15,434
■■
8,984
1980 1,854 15,584 8,406
1981 1,850 15,400 8,324
1982 1,884 17,365 9,217
1983 1,861 18,434 9,905
1984 1,855 19,321 10,416
1985 1,877 20,835 11,100
1986 1,867 22,177 11,878
1987 1,882 22,613 12,015
1988 1,897 23,584 12,432
1989 1,872 24,746 13,219
Table 3c
Carleton College
TUITION AND FEES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 7,346 47.60% 4,276
1980 7,267 46.63% -1.08% 3,920
1981 7,411 48.12% 1.98% 4,006
1982 8,297 47.78% 11.96% 4,404
1983 9,739 52.83% 17.38% 5,233
1984 10,496 54.32% 7.77% 5,658
1985 10,679 51.26% 1.74% 5,689
1986 11,920 53.75% 11.62% 6,385
1987 12,325 54.50% 3.40% 6,549
1988 12,880 54.61% 4.50% 6,790
1989 14,185 57.32% 10.13% 93.10% 7,577
Year j
1______ i
i
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 4c
Carleton College
ENDOWMENT INCOME (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change
2,453 15.89%
2,844 18.25% 15.94%
2,570 16.69% -9.63%
3,154 18.16% 22.72%
3,078 16.70% -2.41%
2,797 14.48% -9.13%
3,564 17.11% 27.42%
3,601 16.24% 1.04%
3,237 14.31% -10.11%
3,647 15.46% 12.67%
3,647 14.74% 0.00%
Total
Change
48.68%
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 5c
Carleton College 
PRIVATE GIFTS, GRANTS, AND CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1,423 9.22% j 828
1,093 7.01% -23.19% i 590
1,091 7.08% -0.18% j 590
1,240 7.14% 13.66% | 658
1,307 7.09% 5.40% ! 702
1,409 7.29% 7.80% 760
1,713 8.22% 21.58% 913
1,720 7.76% 0.41% 921
1,948 8.61% 13.26% 1,035
1,737 7.37% -10.83% 916
1,647 6.66% -5.18% 15.74% 880
Tabie 6c
Carleton College
STATE GOVERNMENT APPROPRIATIONS (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 115 0.75% 67
1980 103 0.66% -10.43% 56
1981 96 0.62% -6.80% 52
1982 88 0.51% -8.33% 47
1983 81 0.44% -7.95% 44
1984 73 0.38% -9.88% 39
1985 77 0.37% 5.48% 41
1986 85 0.38% 10.39% 46
1987 91 0.40% 7.06% 48
1988 84 0.36% -7.69% 44
1989 87 0.35% 3.57% -24.35% 46
Table 7c
Carleton College
STATE GOVERNMENT GRANTS AND CONTRACTS (1979 dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 114 0.74% 66
1980 107 0.69% -6.14% 58
1981 115 0.75% 7.48% i 62
1982 266 1.53% 131.30% 141
1983 260 1.41% -2.26% 140
1984 227 1.17% -12.69% 122
1985 28 0.13% -87.67% 15
1986 24 0.11% -14.29% 13
1987 237 1.05% 887.50% 126
1988 260 1.10% 9.70% 137
1989 238 0.96% -8.46% 108.77% 127
Table 8c
Carleton College
ADJUSTED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT GRANTS & CONTRACTS (1979 Dollars)
(excluding Pell Grants)
f Year
I
I
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Chanqe
Amount/
Student
1979 418 2.71% 243
1980 633 4.06% 51.44% 341
1981 461 2.99% -27.17% 249
1982 543 3.13% 17.79% 288
1983 202 1.10% -62.80% 109
1984 395 2.04% 95.54% 213
1985 732 3.51% 85.32% 390
1986 765 3.45% 4.51% 410
1987 677 2.99% -11.50% 360
1988 672 2.85% -0.74% 354
1989 555 2.24% -17.41% 32.78% 296
Table 9c
Carleton College
REVENUES FROM AUXILIARY ENTERPRISES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 3,378 21.89% 1,966
1980 3,236 20.76% -4.20% 1,745 j
1981 3,370 21.88% 4.14% 1,822:
1982 3,524 20.29% 4.57% 1,870 [
1983 3,596 19.51% 2.04% 1,9321
1984 3,609 18.68% 0.36% 1,946 j
1985 3,669 17.61% 1.66% 1,9551
1986 3,693 16.65% 0.65% 1,9781
1987 3,777 16.70% 2.27% 2,007 i
1988 3,838 16.27% 1.62% 2,0231
1989 3,971 16.05% 3.47% 17.55% 2,121!
Table 10c
Carleton College
TOTAL E&G EXPENDITURES
Year Enrollment Total E&G 
Expenditure
Expense/
Student
79 1718 11331 6.595
80 1854 11416 6.157
81 1850 11452 6.190
82 1884 12608 6.692
83 1861 13850 7.442
84 1855 14869 8.016
85 1877 16031 8.541
86 1867 17462 9.353
87 1882 18312 9.730
88 1897 19286 10.167
89 1872 20006 10.687
Table 11c
Carleton College
EXPENDITURES FOR INSTRUCTION (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 4,436 39.15% 2,582
1980 4,586 40.17% 3.38% 2,474
1981 4,495 39.25% -1.98% 2,430
1982 4,996 39.63% 11.15% 2,652
1983 5,356 38.67% 7.21% 2,878
1984 5,752 38.68% 7.39% 3,101
1985 6,116 38.15% 6.33% 3,258
1986 6,671 38.20% 9.07% 3,573
1987 6,836 37.33% 2.47% 3,632
1988 7,065 36.63% 3.35% 3,724
1989 7,175 35.86% 1.56% 61.74% 3,833
Table 12c
Carleton College
ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 830 7.33% 483
1980 863 7.56% 3.98% 465
1981 921 8.04% 6.72% 498
1982 969 7.69% 5.21% 514
1983 1,125 8.12% 16.10% 605
1984 1,219 8.20% 8.36% 657
1985 1,320 8.23% 8.29% 703
1986 1,427 8.17% 8.11% 764
1987 1,659 9.06% 16.26% 882
1988 1,621 8.41% -2.29% 855
1989 1,694 8.47% 4.50% 104.10% 905
Table 13c 
Carleton College
NON-LIBRARY ACADEMIC SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
222
432
264
295
383
448
660
602
757
710
760
1.96%
3.78%
2.31%
2.34%
2.77%
3.01%
4.12%
3.45%
4.13%
3.68%
3.80%
94.59%
-38.89%
11.74%
29.83%
16.97%
47.32%
-8.79%
25.75%
- 6.21%
7.04% 242.34%
129
233
143
157
206
242
352
322
402
374
406
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 14c
Carleton College
LIBRARY EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
rotal % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
608 5.37% i 354
432 3.78% -28.95% ! 233
657 5.74% 52.08% 355
674 5.35% 2.59% 358
741 5.35% 9.94% 398
771 5.19% 4.05% 416
660 4.12% -14.40% 352
825 4.72% 25.00% 442
902 4.93% 9.33% 479
911 4.72% 1.00% 480
934 4.67% 2.52% 53.62% 499
Table 15c
Carleton College
STUDENT SERVICES EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,327 11.71% 772
1980 1,345 11.78% 1.36% 725
1981 1,351 11.80% 0.45% 730
1982 1,422 11.28% 5.26% 755
1983 1,542 11.13% 8.44% 829
1984 1,600 10.76% 3.76% 863
1985 1,711 10.67% 6.94% 912
1986 1,843 10.55% 7.71% 987
1987 1,905 10.40% 3.36% 1,012
1988 2,031 10.53% 6.61% 1,071
1989 2,186 10.93% 7.63% 64.73% 1,168
Year
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
Table 16c
Carleton College
INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change
14.67%
15.15% 4.03%
15.35% 1.68%
14.44% 3.53%
14.77% 12.36%
15.47% 12.47%
15.09% 5.17%
15.35% 10.83%
15.16% 3.54%
17.32% 20.35%
16.79% 0.54%
Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1,662
1,729
1,758
1,820
2,045
2,300
2,419
2,681
2,776
3,341
3,359 102.11%
967:
933!
950!
966
1,099
1,240
1,289
1,436
1,475
1,761
1,794
Table 17c
Carleton College
OPERATIONS AND MAINTENANCE OF PLANT (1979 Dollars)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,338 11.81% 779
1980 1,316 11.53% -1.64% 710
1981 1,304 11.39% -0.91% 705
1982 1,353 10.73% 3.76% 718
1983 1,471 10.62% 8.72% 790
1984 1,625 10.93% 10.47% 876
1985 1,597 9.96% -1.72% 851
1986 1,686 9.66% 5.57% 903
1987 1,672 9.13% -0.83% 888
1988 1,678 8.70% 0.36% 885
1989 1,865 9.32% 11.14% 39.39% 996
Table 18c
Carleton College
ADJUSTED SCHOLARSHIP AND FELLOWSHIPS EXPENDITURES (1979 Dollars)
(excluding Pell Grants)
Year Total % of Total 
Revenues
% Change Total
Change
Amount/
Student
1979 1,217 10.74% 708
1980 1,060 9.29% -12.90% 572
1981 1,132 9.88% 6.79% 612
1982 1,619 12.84% 43.02% 859
1983 1,904 13.75% 17.60% 1,023
1984 1,992 13.40% 4.62% 1,074
1985 2,111 13.17% 5.97% 1,125
1986 2,391 13.69% 13.26% 1,281
1987 2,517 13.75% 5.27% 1,337
1988 2,661 13.80% 5.72% 1,403
1989 3,025 15.12% 13.68% 148.56% 1,616
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Appendix A
I. Overall Financial Condition (Q. 1-3)
1. How would you characterize the present financial 
condition of your institution? (In trouble? Scope? Problem 
area?) Is this view shared by faculty? Students?
Trustees? Public?
2. What are the prospects for the decade ahead? (Demands 
of new projects. Prospects for "new" -- flexible-money.)
3. How does the current and prospective financial picture 
compare with the decade of the 1980s.
4. What are the major factors influencing the financial 
situation of your institution? (Rank factors, weight, if 
possible.)
a. Income side
(1) Effect of inflation
(2) Effect of changing governmental support
b. Expenditure side
(1) Academic
(2) Nonacademic
a. Decrease of traditional student
b. Increased accountability requirements
c. Consultants fees
5. Has the "knowledge explosion" been a significant
factor?
6. Looking over the last decade, how would you describe 
the rate of program growth at your institution? (New
schools, colleges, departments, programs, etc.
7. Will this rate continue in the 1990s?
8. What is the main impact of your current financial
condition on the academic plan for your institution?
9. Have actual plans for any of the following been 
eliminated, postponed, or cut back?
a. New colleges
b. New departments or institutes
c . New courses
d. Undergraduate seminars or tutorials
e . Library
f . Special admission of "underqualified" students
g. Community service programs
h. Capital expansion - land acquisition
i. Research programs
j . Other programs
Note the effect of financial situation on planned (or
normal) rate of increase in:
a . Faculty salaries
b. Teaching assistant salaries
c. The number of T/A's
d. The number of regular faculty
e . The number of administrative posts
f . The number of nonacademic employees
g* Nonacademic salaries
h. Undergraduate seminars or tutorials
i . Experimental Programs
j . Admissions of "underqualified" students
k. Funds for students aid
1. Percentage of graduate students
m. Overall enrollment targets
n. Funds for athletic or similar activities
0. Research activities
p. Community service programs
q. Other
10. Has the financial situation forced you to eliminate any 
of the following?
a. Colleges
b. Departments
c. Faculty positions
d. Courses
e. Enrollment
f. Summer instruction
g. Intercollegiate athletic competition
h. Debate, music, or similar activities
1. Community service programs
j. Undergraduate seminars, or tutorials 
k. Research activities
1. Experimental programs
m. Other
11. What are your most important unmet needs? (Rank if 
possible.) (How affected by financial situation?)
12. Has your financial situation had a significant effect 
on your ability to attract and hold qualified faculty? Has
the "mix" of the faculty changed? What percent have tenure?
13. Has there been an increase in class size? (Overall 
student-faculty ratio.)
14. How good is the fit between aspiration and actual 
program (or situation)?
a. Your faculty
b. Your students
15. Has there been a significant reallocation of resources 
among the various departments or functions? (From more
expensive to less expensive areas? More productive? What
criterion?)
16. Are you being forced to cut your budge base?
17. What percentage of student aid is financed by 
restricted private gifts and endowments? How much from 
general funds?
18. Has your financial situation effected campus decision­
making processes (priority setting, reallocation)?
19. Has your financial condition produced desirable results 
(i.e. chance to get rid of "dead-wood," a needed impetus 
toward reorganization and reduction of inefficiency, more 
attention to cost, productivity, program goals, etc.)? 
(Increased faculty, student understanding of financial 
problems?)
20. How would you rate your institution's efficiency?
(Identify problems.)
21. How should productivity be measured?
22. What efforts have been (are being) made to raise
productivity, increase efficiency?
a. Cutting attrition rate. What is attrition rate?
b. Night and Saturday classes
c. Change in terms (semester/quarters)
d. Program budge procedures
e. Relating expenditure to output
f. Departmental (school, college) efficiency
g. Eliminate course overlap
h. Reorganization of administration
i. More effective space utilization
j . Use of new technology in instruction
k. Modernization of library
1. Increasing the teaching load
m. Studies of operations
n. Other (in detail)
23. What are the prospects for increasing income in the 
decade of the 1990s?
24. Are there current increased efforts to raise income?
a. New areas for procuring income?
b. New approaches to procure income from existing 
areas?
c. Change in investment policy regarding the stock 
portfolio?
d. Increased tuition or fees?
e. Increased efforts at obtaining gifts and grants?
f. An information campaign aimed at the public and 
governmental bodies for the purpose of increasing the amount
of government support?
g. Which area(s) are the most successful in 
increasing income?
25. In addition to factors already mentioned, are you 
taking specific measures to reduce expenses? (Scope of 
measures, overall impact.)
26. Have you made any public statements regarding the 
financial condition?
27. What reallocations of resources would you make if you 
had the power?
28. What policy measures do you recommend to improve the 
financial situation of your institution and all institutions 
of higher education? (Role of federal and state government)
29. Other comments on financial condition and its impact? 
(Things the public, alumni, legislators, should know.)
Appendix B
Current funds revenues -- All unrestricted gifts, grants,
and other resources earned during the reporting period, 
and restricted resources to the extent that such funds 
are expended for current operating purposes. Current 
funds revenues do not include restricted current funds 
received but not expended because these revenues are 
not earned.
Tuition and fees -- All tuition and fees (including student 
activity fees) assessed against students for education 
purposes. Included are tuition and fee remissions or 
exemptions even though there was no intention of 
collecting from the student. Included are those 
tuitions and fees that are remitted to the State as an 
offset to the state appropriation. (Charges for room, 
board, and other services rendered by auxiliary 
enterprises are not reported here.
Government grants and contracts -- Revenues from government 
agencies which are for specific research projects or 
other types of programs. Examples are research 
projects, training programs, and similar activities for 
which amounts are received or expenditures are 
reimbursable under the terms of a government grant or 
contract. Related indirect costs recovered are 
reported as unrestricted revenues. Amounts equal to 
direct costs incurred are recorded as charges against
current restricted funds and reported as restricted 
current funds revenues.
Private gifts, grants, and contracts -- Revenues from
private donors for which no legal consideration is 
involved and private contracts for specific goods and 
services provided to the funder as stipulation for 
receipt of the funds. Included are only those gifts, 
grants, and contracts that are directly related to 
instruction, research, public service, or other 
institutional purposes. Monies received as a result 
of gifts, grants, or contracts from a foreign 
government are reported here.
Endowment income -- The unrestricted income of endowment and 
similar funds; restricted income of endowment and 
similar funds to the extent that they are expended for 
current operating purposes; and income from funds held 
in trust by others under irrevocable trusts. Capital 
gains or losses are not included. If any such gains 
are spent for current operations, they are treated as 
transfers, NOT revenues. Endowment income for 
hospitals is excluded. Institutions that have adopted 
a spending formula by which they expend not only the 
yield, but also a prudent portion of the appreciation 
of the principal, report the amount calculated by the 
"total return" concept. The amount so calculated is 
adjusted for protection of the endowment principal from 
its loss of purchasing power if that provision is part
of the spending formula.
Auxiliary enterprises -- All revenues generated by or
collected from the auxiliary enterprise operations of 
the institution that exist to furnish a service to 
students, faculty, or staff, and that charge a fee that 
is directly related to, although not necessarily equal 
to, the cost to the service. Auxiliary enterprises are 
managed as essentially self-supporting activities. 
Examples are residence halls, food services, student 
health services, intercollegiate athletics, college 
unions, college stores, and movie theaters. This 
category is limited to revenues derived directly from 
the operation of the auxiliary enterprises themselves. 
Revenues from gifts, grants, or endowment income 
restricted for auxiliary enterprises are reported under 
their respective source categories.
Other sources -- All sources of current funds revenue not 
covered elsewhere. Examples are interest income and 
gains (net of losses) from investments of unrestricted 
current funds, miscellaneous rentals and sales, expired 
term endowments, and terminated annuity or life income 
agreements, if not material. Included are revenues 
resulting from the sales and services of internal 
service departments to persons or agencies external to 
the institution (e.g., the sale of computer time).
Independent operations -- All revenues associated with
operations independent of or unrelated to the primary
missions of the institution (i.e., instruction, 
research, public service) although they may contribute 
indirectly to the enhancement of these programs. This 
category generally includes only those revenues 
associated with major Federally funded research and 
development centers. The net profit (or loss) from 
operations owned and managed as investments of the 
institution's endowment funds are not included here.
Current funds expenditures and transfers -- The costs
incurred for goods and services used in the conduct of 
the institution's operations. They include the 
acquisition cost of capital assets, such as equipment 
and library books, to the extent current funds are 
budgeted for and used by operating departments for such 
purposes.
Instruction -- Expenditures of the colleges, schools,
departments, and other instructional divisions of the 
institution and expenditures for departmental research 
and public service that are not separately budgeted are 
included in this classification. Included are 
expenditures for both credit and noncredit activities. 
Excluded are expenditures for academic administration 
where the primary function is administration (e.g., 
academic deans). The instruction category includes 
general academic instruction, occupational and 
vocational instruction, special session instruction, 
community education, preparatory and adult basic
education, and remedial and tutorial instruction 
conducted by the teaching faculty for the institution's 
students.
Academic support -- This category includes expenditures for 
the support services that are an integral part of the 
institution's primary mission of instruction, research, 
or public service. Included are expenditures for 
libraries, museums, galleries, audio/visual services, 
academic computing support, ancillary support, academic 
administration, personnel development, and course and 
curriculum development. Included also expenditures for 
veterinary and dental clinics if their primary purpose 
is to support the institutional program.
Student services -- Funds expended for admissions, registrar 
activities, and activities whose primary purpose is to 
contribute to students' emotional and physical well­
being and to their intellectual, cultural, and social 
development outside the context of the formal 
instructional program. Examples are career guidance, 
counseling, financial aid
administration, and student health services (except 
when operated as a self-supporting auxiliary 
enterprise). Included are the administrative allowance 
for Pell grants.
Institutional support -- Expenditures for the day-to-day 
operational support of the institution, excluding 
expenditures for physical plant operations. Included
are expenditures for general administrative services, 
executive direction and planning, legal and fiscal 
operations, and public relations/development.
Operation and maintenance of plant -- All expenditures for 
operations established to provide service and 
maintenance related to grounds and facilities used for 
educational and general purposes. Also included are 
expenditures for utilities, fire protection, property 
insurance, and similar items. Expenditures made from 
the institutional plant funds account are not included.
Scholarships and fellowships -- All expenditures given in 
the form of outright grants and trainee stipends to 
individuals enrolled in formal coursework, either for 
credit or noncredit. Aid to students in the form of 
tuition or fee remissions are included. (excluded are 
those remissions that are granted because of faculty or 
staff status. These are charged to staff benefits.) 
College work-study program expenses are not reported 
here; these are reported expenses where the student 
served (e.g., dining hall, line 13; for a professor). 
Included Pell Grants (formerly BEOGs). (Additional 
information on scholarships and fellowships included is 
reported here.
Auxiliary enterprises -- This category includes those 
essentially self-supporting operations of the 
institution that exist to furnish a service to 
students, faculty, or staff, and that charge a fee that
is directly related to, although not necessarily equal 
to, the cost of the service. Examples are residence 
halls, food services, student health services, 
intercollegiate athletics, college unions, college 
stores, and barber shops.
Independent operations -- All funds expended for operations 
that are independent of or unrelated to the primary 
missions of the institution (i.e., instruction, 
research, public service), although they may contribute 
indirectly to the enhancement of these programs. This 
category is generally limited to expenditures of major 
Federally funded research and development centers. 
investments of the institution's endowment funds are 
not included.
